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Olivia S. Choe
I. THE NEED To REASSESS REGULATED RIPARIANISM
Until recently, the eastern United States has been blessed with an
abundance of water; unlike the arid West, shortages in the East have
historically been "rare and short-lived."' During the past few decades,
however, water has increasingly become scarce, due to recurring droughts
and burgeoning urban and suburban populations.2 A severe drought struck
1. Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the
Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 9 (2002) [hereinafter
Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation]; see also George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems,
in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 7, 8 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1998) (noting
that water resources in the East were historically abundant); A. Dan Tarlock, Discovering the
Virtues ofRiparianism, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 249,249 (1990) (same).
"Eastern" states, for purposes of this Note, are those east of Kansas City, Missouri. Western
states are governed by prior appropriation doctrine or dual riparian-appropriation regimes. See
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Riparianism [hereinafter Dellapenna, Riparianism], in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 87, 88-89 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
2. See Robert H. Abrams, Water Allocation by Comprehensive Permit Systems in the East:
Considering a Move Away from Orthodoxy, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 255, 259 (1990); Richard C.
Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: Problems and Proposals, 66 KY. L.J. 191, 191
(1977); Lynda L. Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction:
Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 95, 96-97 &
n.3 (1985) (claiming that scarcity has caused growing problems for eastern states since the 1970s
due to droughts, rapid population growth, extensive commercial development, and pollution of
available water supplies); James N. Christman, Riparian Doctrine, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE
EASTERN UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 21, 29; Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation,
supra note 1, at 10. But see Tarlock, supra note 1, at 250 (arguing that, while eastern water
sources are "stressed," protection of nonconsumptive instream uses, rather than consumptive uses,
is the primary challenge); A. Dan Tarlock, Introduction, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535, 537-38
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the East Coast in 2002,3 forcing residents in rural Maine to stop flushing
toilets and washing dishes, 4 significantly damaging crops in the Midwest, 5
and leading New Jersey to ban lawn watering. 6 But that drought was only
the latest and harshest of several that have hit the region since the 1980s.
7
Rapid population growth and commercial development in and around
eastern cities have also contributed to shortages, in some cases leading to
interstate disputes. 9 Scientists predict that erratic precipitation patterns will
(1983) (suggesting that water problems in the East arise not from too much consumption, but
rather from land-use problems and nonconsumptive uses).
3. See Douglas Jehl, Development and a Drought Cut Carolinas' Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2002, at Al ("[A] drought... is now affecting more than a third of the United
States....").
4. See Blaine Harden, After Dry Year, Maine Is Now Soaked, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at
A14 (describing measures taken by Maine residents during "the driest year on record in this
normally rainy state").
5. See Harvests Suffering Because of Drought, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at AI0 ("A brutal
drought across the grain belt will result in the smallest corn and soybean harvest since the mid-
1990's .... ),
6. See Ronald Smothers, New Jersey Bans Lawn Watering as a Lingering Drought Worsens,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2002, at B2 (noting that "7 of the last 12 months were the driest in the
state's history and that August was shaping up as the driest August ever").
7. See Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that southeastern
states suffered "three major droughts in the 1980s"); Jehl, supra note 3 (observing that
"accumulated rainfall since 1998" is "more than forty inches below normal"); Kirk Johnson,
Drought Rules End, but They May Come Again Another Day, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2002, at BI
(discussing the "drought cycle of drier than normal weather" that has hovered over the East since
1998, and the belief of some officials "that more frequent droughts were likely in coming years");
Joy Powell, Sugar-Beet Farmers To Get Disaster Aid, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov.
19, 2003, at D2 (stating that drought struck Minnesota farmers in both 2001 and 2002); Three
States Delay Water-Sharing Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at All (describing a drought in the
Southeast that has "lasted four years").
8. See Butler, supra note 2, at 98 (arguing that "rapid population growth" and "extensive
commercial development... are beginning to cause water supply problems to arise even when
drought conditions do not exist"); Jehl, supra note 3 (discussing weather abnormalities in the
Carolinas that have been "compounded by sprawling growth" and have "sent water use spiraling
ahead even of population increases and ... cut into supplies of water that would have otherwise
recharged aquifers, rivers and streams"); Emily Shartin, Corporations Add Loop to Water Cycle;
Recycling Efforts Earn Praise from Water Officials, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Boston Globe File ("In recent years, explosive residential growth has taxed local
supplies, forcing many suburban communities to impose water bans and other restrictions to rein
in use.").
9. One interstate dispute arose recently between Virginia and Maryland; another involved
Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. See Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598, 603 (2003) (describing
the dispute over rights to divert water in the Potomac River that arose when Maryland officials
objected to Virginia's proposal to construct a new intake facility in the river, arguing that it would
encourage urban sprawl); Dustin S. Stephenson, The Tri-State Compact: Falling Waters and
Fading Opportunities, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 83, 84 (2000) (claiming that "sprawling
development and booming industry in and around the Atlanta, Georgia, area has sparked a three
state dispute between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over water rights in the Chattahoochee
River"); Three States Delay Water-Sharing Plan, supra note 7 (observing that Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia have delayed for the twelfth time the implementation of their water-sharing plan, and
reviewing the conflicting claims of the states on water in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River system).
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persist, producing recurring droughts in years to come; 10 continued growth
in demand will only exacerbate the consequences of weather shifts.
For policymakers, water shortages present three central challenges.
First and most obviously, scarcity reminds us of the limits of our natural
resources, and forces us to consider conservation measures. Second,
scarcity requires that we assess the efficiency of water allocation and usage.
Third-especially in the context of water, a universally necessary
resource-equity demands that basic needs be met, and that one group of
users not be allowed to exclude another group from an essential resource. In
recent decades, water shortages have compelled eastern lawmakers to face
these three issues-conservation, efficiency, and equity-directly. The
result has been growing dissatisfaction with the legal regime that had
historically governed the distribution of water rights in the East: common
law riparianism.
Under riparianism, "an owner of land abutting a waterbody has the
right to have the water continue to flow... subject to the equal rights of
each owner to make strictly limited use of the water."' Riparian
landowners, also called riparians, "share the common benefits that arise
from adjacency to defined bodies of water."' 2 Although riparian law had
governed surface water in the East from the time of the first Anglo-
American settlers, 13 it came under increasing criticism during the latter half
of the twentieth century. From a conservation standpoint, riparianism failed
to protect against excessive diversions by riparians, or to ensure minimum
stream flows for the public.1 4 From an efficiency standpoint, riparian rights
were inherently uncertain because they were correlatively defined, and thus
could shift over time as neighboring users and uses changed; 15 uncertainty,
in turn, inhibited investment and prevented the development of markets in
transferable water rights.16 And from an equity standpoint, riparianism was
accused of favoring private agrarian interests.' 7 Moreover, because rights
10. Scientists studying global warming predict that droughts will recur and become more
severe. Frank D. Roylance, Climate Change 'Entering the Unknown': No Doubt Human Activity
Is Altering Earth's Atmosphere, Experts Say, BALT. SUN, Dec. 3, 2003, at 4A; see also
Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 86-87 (observing that shortfalls are
expected to become more common).
11. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 206.
12. Id. at 89.
13. Id. at 206-12 (describing the origins of American riparianism in the English common
law).
14. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 25 (2d ed. 1988).
15. Abrams, supra note 2, at 257-58, 262-63; Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation,
supra note 1, at 16.
16. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16. Transferability of water
rights was also impeded by the appurtenancy requirement, which I discuss in detail below. See
infra Part II.
17. Butler, supra note 2, at 99 (noting the argument that "the common law restricts
redistribution of water resources for public use").
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were determined by ex post litigation, riparianism-like any common law
regime-lacked a procedural mechanism for reallocating resources to those
in need during times of scarcity.
18
In the hopes of addressing these doctrinal shortcomings and better
dealing with water shortages, approximately half of the eastern states
formerly governed by common law riparianism established water permit
systems, also known as permitting systems.19 These regulated riparian
statutes-often adopted in response to scarcity concerns 20 -envision a
rationalized, administrative approach to water rights allocation.1 In theory,
regulated riparianism requires that all direct users obtain a limited-duration,
renewable permit from a state administrative agency.22 This presumably
allows the agency to make comprehensive ex ante decisions about preferred
uses and impacts on other users, rather than resolve single disputes in ex
post litigation. Agencies also have authority to reallocate water during
times of shortage.23 While these regulatory schemes are usually meant to be
comprehensive, certain groups of users are often exempt from the permit
24requirement. In contrast with common law riparianism, use on nonriparian
land is generally allowed under permitting systems.
What has become apparent over the last few decades, however, is that
regulated riparianism suffers from its own weaknesses and, more
importantly, has failed to solve many of the problems associated with
traditional riparian law. Because of the exemptions accorded large groups
of users, regulated riparianism appears "piecemeal," incoherent, and
protective of inefficient uses.26 Even in those cases where permits are
required, agencies tend to favor existing or grandfathered uses, thus
preventing reallocation from lower- to higher-value uses.27 In addition,
because permits create rights that are temporary and often "use-specific,"
18. See Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 16; Tarlock, supra note 1,
at 249.
19. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Issues Arising Under Riparian Rights: Replacing Common-Law
Riparian Rights with Regulated Riparianism, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED
STATES, supra note 1, at 35, 37.
20. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 255; Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note
1, at 10; Gould, supra note 1, at 13.
21. The systems are varied; the description here summarizes only the more common features.
See Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 417.
22. Dellapenna, supra note 19, at 42.
23. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 36-37; Dellapenna,
Riparianism, supra note 1, at 540-46.
24. See, e.g., Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 72 (describing
Georgia's exemption of farm uses, which "remain far and away the largest use of water in
Georgia"); see also Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 457-58 (describing exemptions for
domestic and agricultural uses).
25. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
26. George William Sherk, Eastern Water Law: Trends in State Legislation, 9 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 287, 290-91 (1990); Tarlock, supra note 1, at 249.
27. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 37-38 (noting that agencies
seldom deny a permit, but rather tend to impose conditions on renewal).
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voluntary transfer markets have failed to develop.28 Agencies also often fail
to institute conservation-oriented norms in their permitting decisions.29
Finally, agencies have yet to develop satisfactory methods for allocating
rights during shortages. 30 In short, permitting systems have not proved
much more successful than their common law predecessor in addressing
problems of conservation, efficiency, and equity.
It is thus time for eastern policymakers to reassess regulated
riparianism. Indeed, some states are currently in the process of intensely
reviewing their water allocation laws, while those that lack permitting
schemes are likely to impose some mode of regulation in the near future. 31
Most eastern water law scholars believe that the answer is more
comprehensive management and greater centralization of control.32 Richard
Ausness, for instance, calls for the abolition of exemptions for large-scale
users, increased centralization and coordination of administration, and more
detailed planning for shortages. 3 Joseph Dellapenna likewise characterizes
less-than-comprehensive schemes as "an unseemly hodgepodge of
requirements, 3 4 and advocates the creation of "effective comprehensive
planning mechanisms., 35 But is a policy of greater centralization and
28. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 281; Richard Ausness, Water Rights Legislation in the East:
A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1983); Dellapenna, The Law of
Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 38.
29. See, e.g., Donna Sheehan Fitzgerald, Note, Extending Public Trust Duties to Vermont's
Agencies: A Logical Interpretation of the Common Law Public Trust Doctrine, 19 VT. L. REV.
509, 509-10 (1995) (arguing that recent decisions in Vermont have stripped agencies of their
ability to consider the public's interests in permitting decisions, unless the legislature has
expressly given them that ability); see also infra notes 190-195 and accompanying text
(describing the failure of permitting agencies to protect minimum stream flows).
30. See Dellapenna, supra note 19, at 44 (claiming that agencies "free up far less water
through the renewal process" and "tend to promote lower-valued uses rather than higher-valued
uses" through fee rates and exemptions); Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1,
at 36 (criticizing agencies for consulting with large water users during times of scarcity, rather
than relying on administrative expertise, and stating that "administering agencies prefer to
use ... allocative methods least likely to provoke litigation or other difficulties for the agency").
3 1. Bradford Bowman, Instream Flow Regulation: Plugging the Holes in Maine's Water
Law, 54 ME. L. REV. 287, 310 (2002) (suggesting that it is likely that Maine will consider
minimum stream flow regulations "as the state reevaluates the need to control water
consumption"); Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 88 (noting that Georgia
has expressly undertaken a review of its regulatory scheme).
32. An exception is Robert Abrams, who in some instances favors targeted regulatory
solutions over comprehensive ones. See Abrams, supra note 2, at 275-76. Abrams's argument is
that regulation may either be too specific, regulating where unnecessary, see id. at 274, or may not
be specific enough, see id. at 277. As a solution, he proposes ways to improve agency
performance, such as better data collection, differential management of different types of water,
transferable rights, price incentives, and clearer policy guidance. See id. at 279-83. In short,
Abrams's focus is on how regulatory institutions, as currently structured, might improve their
performance. My emphasis is instead on how alternative institutional structures and possibilities
might contribute to better water management.
33. Ausness, supra note 28, at 589.
34. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 445; see also Sherk, supra note 26, at 290-91
(criticizing piecemeal approaches as creating greater uncertainty).
35. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 448.
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increased managerial control necessarily the wisest approach? Are there
alternative governance regimes that might achieve greater efficiency, higher
levels of conservation, or a viable market in water rights?
Drawing on the extensive common property literature, this Note argues
that such alternatives are indeed available. A wide body of scholarship in
anthropology and institutional economics demonstrates that local users in a
variety of contexts, from lobster fishing to irrigation, have been able to
develop sustainable methods for managing scarce, common-pool resources,
thereby overcoming a tragedy of the commons without the need for
government regulation. This Note asserts that the organizational and
institutional insights offered by common property scholarship are relevant
to contemporary water management.
The Note begins by suggesting that the common property model 36 may
not be such a remote concept in eastern water law after all. Indeed, close
consideration of traditional riparian law reveals the outlines of the common
property model embedded in the doctrine itself. Specifically, Part II argues
that the appurtenancy requirement within riparian law-restricting riparian
rights to appurtenant owners and restricting usage to appurtenant land-
bears distinct similarities to key features of common property regimes.
Limiting rights to those owning riparian land functioned as a proxy for
creating an exclusive community,37 while restricting usage to appurtenant
land capped, in a rough way, total usage of the resource. 38 Drawing on
the appurtenancy doctrine, as well as the common property literature, I
urge greater attention to certain central principles of resource conservation
and management-principles that the appurtenancy doctrine, properly
understood, can be seen to support.
I should be clear from the outset about the goals of such an
interpretation of the appurtenancy requirement. Identifying similarities
between the appurtenancy doctrine and common property regimes is meant
to illuminate structural values that have proved durable in a variety of
contexts. In particular, I emphasize the success of groups of users who are
closest to a common-pool resource at managing against its scarcity. For
critics of riparianism who may be skeptical of the wisdom of returning to
36. Various scholars have used various terms to describe common property regimes. I follow
Thomas Dietz and his coauthors and use the term "common property" to denote "a kind of
management arrangement created by humans rather than a characteristic iof the resource itself,"
and the term "common-pool" resource to denote "resources from which it is hard to exclude
users." Thomas Dietz et al., The Drama of the Commons, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 3, 17
(Elinor Ostrom et al. eds., 2002).
37. Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 132 (1998) (describing limited common
property as "property held as a commons among the members of a group, but exclusively vis-A-vis
the outside world").
38. Related doctrines, such as the watershed requirement, assisted in setting a cap on total
usage. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1914 [Vol. 113: 1909
Appurtenancy Reconceptualized
the common law for inspiration, I would stress that it is appurtenancy's
underlying principles-the principles of proximity to, and familiarity with,
the resource at stake-and not merely the formal doctrinal rules that
continue to bear relevance.
In fact, the rigorous requirements of the appurtenancy doctrine have
been significantly modified in the last century and a half, and in many
jurisdictions they no longer strictly govern. Part III examines case law
reflecting this doctrinal shift and concludes that the decline of the
appurtenancy requirement was the inevitable result of another key doctrine
in riparian law: the reasonable use requirement, under which riparian rights
are correlative and are limited only by the rights of other riparian
proprietors.3 I argue that whereas the appurtenancy doctrine relied on a
fundamental limiting approach to resources, the reasonable use doctrine, as
interpreted and applied by the courts, relied instead on an inherently
tolerant and expansionist ethic. Contrasting these two strands within
riparianism serves several purposes: It provides a doctrinal explanation for
the weakness of the appurtenancy requirement, it suggests a historical
account of the law's failure to conserve, and it highlights a distinction-
important for resource-management purposes-between rules that limit
usage and those that balance users' interests.
Part IV returns to the context of regulated riparianism, and argues that
the appurtenancy and reasonable use doctrines have important implications
for ongoing management of surface water in the East.40 I first note that
existing regulatory schemes tend to replicate reasonable use doctrine and
conclude that, in their current form, they are unlikely to effectively resolve
scarcity problems. I then explore potential alternatives to comprehensive
regulation that might better reflect appurtenancy's respect for those closest
to a resource and their ability to conserve. While recognizing that small-
scale community management may be unrealistic in the eastern water
context, and a return to appurtenancy proper undesirable, I nevertheless
urge consideration of institutional models combining greater local control
with broader government oversight. Such "nested enterprises ''41 can offer
the advantages of both the commons and the state, while potentially
39. See, e.g., Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) ("[N]o
proprietor has a right to use the water to the prejudice of another.... [T]he right being common to
all ... , no one has a right to diminish the quantity which will, according to the natural current,
flow to a proprietor below .... There may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is
common to all, a reasonable use."); see also Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 241.
40. Placing surface water and groundwater under separate legal regimes has been subject to
widespread criticism because it ignores the hydrologic cycle. See, e.g., GEORGE A. GOULD &
DOUGLAS L. GRANT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 335 (6th ed. 2000); T.E. Lauer,
Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. REV. 1, 15 (1970). Discussion of the need for joint
management of surface and ground water is beyond the scope of this Note.
41. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 101-02 (1990) (describing a system of "nested enterprises").
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mitigating their respective weaknesses; by incorporating appurtenancy into
the modem regulatory context, they may thus provide the best opportunity
yet to improve conservation, achieve greater efficiency, and ensure equity
in eastern water usage.
II. THE APPURTENANCY REQUIREMENT AS COMMON PROPERTY REGIME
At its core, riparian water law is about the entitlement of those
bordering on a watercourse to certain use rights.42 The word "riparian"
derives from the Latin ripa, which means the bank of a stream.43 Under the
appurtenancy doctrine, a component of riparianism, only those who own
property abutting the relevant body of water are entitled to access and use
the water;44 in addition, water can only be used on adjacent parcels of
land.45 This dual requirement has been subjected to substantial criticism, 4
6
characterized as outdated and "anachronistic, ' '47 accused of burdening urban
and industrial expansion, 48 blamed for "the development of uneconomical
'bowling-alley' parcels of land, '49 and denounced for impeding the creation
of marketable water rights and the increase in economic efficiency that
many claim would follow. 50 Indeed, overcoming the appurtenancy doctrine
has been cited as "one of the princip[al] motives [behind] the enactment of
42. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
43. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 87 (citing Johnson v. McCowen, 348 So. 2d
357, 360 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)).
44. See, e.g., Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474 ("In virtue of [riparian land] ownership [the riparian
proprietor]... has a right to the use of the water .. "); Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 483
(Mich. 1967) ("[R]iparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible or assignable apart from the
land which includes therein or is bounded by a natural watercourse."); see also Dellapenna,
Riparianism, supra note 1, at 219 (stating that "riparian rights have always depended on the
ownership of land abutting a stream [or lake or sea]" and citing cases).
45. See, e.g., Gould v. Eaton, 49 P. 577, 578 (Cal. 1897) (holding that a riparian owner's right
is "appurtenant to the land bordering on the stream, and does not give him the right to divert the
water to lands which are not riparian to the stream"); Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water
Dist. v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 71 A.2d 520, 530 (Me. 1950) (holding that any use of riparian water on
nonriparian land is per se unreasonable unless acquired by purchase, grant, or eminent domain).
46. "Perhaps no feature of riparian law has received more adverse and critical comment than
the concept that the waters are reserved for the benefit of the lands along the stream ... " GOULD
& GRANT, supra note 40, at 237. Commentators also widely criticize the reasonable use
doctrine-the other key feature of riparianism. The primary complaint is that the reasonable use
doctrine produces rights that are uncertain, likely to change over time, insecure, and therefore not
conducive to investment. See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 1, at 249-50 (describing and then
questioning this critique). I take up the reasonable use doctrine as it relates to the appurtenancy
doctrine in Part Il.
47. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 25.
48. GOULD & GRANT, supra note 40, at 237.
49. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 40 (5th ed. 2002).
50. GOLDFARB, supra note 14, at 25. It is worth noting, however, that criticism of the
appurtenancy requirement has not been uniform. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET, ILLINOIS WATER
RIGHTS LAW 28 (1958) ("[The appurtenancy doctrine] does not appear to be a major problem.
Practically, water can be most efficiently used close to its source and land with riparian rights can
always be purchased.").
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a regulated riparian statute."5 This Part reconsiders the appurtenancy
doctrine in some detail and asserts that its underlying principles may prove
more useful for resource management than its critics typically suggest.
The idea that the restrictions imposed by riparian law may have
functioned as a common property regime has not gone unnoticed. Carol
Rose, in arguing that common property regimes are more common than is
generally recognized, briefly notes that "riparian law in the nineteenth
century effectively turned river-bank landowners into participants in
common property regimes.., from which outsiders were excluded."52
Building on Rose's intuition, this Part fleshes out in more detail the various
ways in which riparian law created, or at least attempted to create, a
common property scheme, and compares this scheme to common property
regimes in a variety of contexts. My goal here is to illuminate key
principles for governing scarce resources.
A. The Ownership Requirement
1. Access Restrictions in Common Property Regimes
Under traditional riparian law, only those who owned property
bordering a watercourse were entitled to riparian rights.53 Conceptually, this
ownership restriction limited access to water to a community of easily
identifiable users. It is what Henry Smith would characterize as an
exclusion rule,54 and it has proved central to conservation and effective
management of common-pool resources in a variety of contexts.55
Exclusivity facilitates the development of social norms that favor
conservation of scarce resources. James Acheson, in his study of Maine
lobstermen, describes harbor gangs as exclusive groups in which
56membership is usually necessary in order to gain access to the resource.
Indeed, some gangs require land ownership in order to gain entry, thereby
51. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 35.
52. Rose, supra note 37, at 179.
53. See supra note 44.
54. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 454-55 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus
Governance] (characterizing exclusion rules as "gatekeeper" rules concerned with "boundaries");
Henry E. Smith, Exclusionary and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming June 2004) (manuscript at 21, on file with author) [hereinafter Smith, The Law of
Nuisance] (characterizing common property regimes as exclusionary).
55. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 41, at 62 (highlighting the strict limitations on "[a]ccess to
well-defined common property [in T6rbel, Switzerland]").
56. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE 64 (1988) (claiming that new
fishermen face "resistance" that "almost amounts to an initiation" upon attempting to enter a
harbor gang, and that "[s]ome entrants are never accepted").
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paralleling riparianism's appurtenancy requirement.5 7 Because groups are
limited in size, members are more likely to form "long-term, multistrand
ties with one another,, 58 which in turn generate norms about "'proper'
behavior." 59 In the fishing context, proper behavior means eschewing
overfishing: "[T]here is a strong feeling that all members should have equal
access to the resource.... Too much success, or success earned the wrong
way.. can generate envy, hostility, and gossip." 60  Lobstering is
recognized as a zero-sum game, and those who play too aggressively are
disliked.6 1 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the most exclusive gangs, which
place the greatest emphasis on longstanding kinship and community ties, 62
are the ones that have "voluntarily agreed to limit the number of traps they
fish. 6 3
Studies of Japanese mountain villages,6 4 Spanish huerta irrigation
communities, 65 Cree Indian fisheries, 66 and Kwakiutl Indian potlatching
practices 67 likewise emphasize the relationship between exclusivity and
sustainable resource usage. These communities developed detailed
harvesting rules or fishing practices that prevented exhaustion of the
resource at stake. As Bonnie McCay and James Acheson put it,
territoriality--or "restricting access to a defined body of people who inhabit
or lay claim to a particular territory"-provides "the basis for the
development of more restrictive common property institutions .... If we
57. Id. at 67. Land ownership is necessary, but not always sufficient. See id. at 68; see also
Carol M. Rose, Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 45, 63 (1999) ("Although newcomers may sometimes enter CPRs [common property
regimes], perhaps through purchase of land within the community, these would-be new entrants
may well have to undergo a seasoning period before being allowed full participation.").
58. ACHESON, supra note 56, at 49; see also id. at 23-47 (detailing longstanding kinship and
community ties).
59. Id. at 33.-
60. Id. at 56. Acheson characterizes a "skilled," "easygoing," "admired" fisherman as an
ideal, but notes that it is rare. Id.
61. Id. ("Fishermen... are convinced that a fixed number of legal-size lobsters inhabit any
given area. If one man takes them, another cannot.").
62. Id. at 67 ("No newcomer can possibly enter such gangs.").
63. Id. at 154.
64. OSTROM, supra note 41, at 65-69 (describing the detailed harvesting rules and collective
work practices that developed in closed village communities).
65. Id. at 69-82.
66. Fikret Berkes, Common-Property Resource Management and Cree Indian Fisheries in
Subarctic Canada, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF
COMMUNAL RESOURCES 66, 70, 74, 87 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987)
(observing that the Cree Indians engage in "community hunting/fishing/trapping [in an] area with
a reasonably well defined boundary" and hold "exclusive use-rights," and describing the
enforcement of "'proper' fishing methods and practices" through social norms).
67. D. Bruce Johnsen, The Formation and Protection of Property Rights Among the Southern
Kwakiutl Indians, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 47, 61 (1986) (arguing that exclusive property fights
held by tribes, or numayms, allowed numaym chiefs to implement wealth-maximizing practices,
such as adjustments in fishing levels to prevent overfishing).
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can keep others out, it makes sense for us to do something about our own
behavior., 68 In these communities, to which access is often strictly
guarded, 69 centuries-long traditions
70 and "trial and error" experience
71
breed conservationist norms.72
Limiting group size also facilitates the monitoring and enforcement of
usage rules.73 Small, enclosed communities benefit from "rich opportunities
for mutual monitoring," which reduce the cost of finding violators.
74 Both
Acheson's lobster gangs and Spanish huerta irrigation systems display
these traits.75 Moreover, because community members are repeat players,
the threat of social sanctions and disrepute are often enough to produce
adherence to usage rules.76 Fikret Berkes notes that among Cree Indians,
"[e]ffective social mechanisms ensure adherence to rules which exist
by virtue of mutual consent .... People who violate these rules
suffer... social disgrace.",77 Similarly, social prestige drives Kwakiutl
68. Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson, Human Ecology of the Commons, in THE
QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES, supra
note 66, at 1, 11.
69. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 41, at 68 (describing the practice of patrolling for
unauthorized users in Japanese mountain villages).
70. Id. at 58.
71. Rose, supra note 57, at 56.
72. See, e.g., Berkes, supra note 66, at 77-79, 83 (describing the Cree solution to the
common-pool problem, which uses practices that are based on extensive knowledge of a resource
developed over time).
73. See Rose, supra note 37, at 140; id. at 157 ("In [common property regimes], informal
norms and user-created enforcement techniques may go some distance toward self-policing and
perimeter defense.").
74. Rose, supra note 57, at 64. Richard Epstein in fact attributes the appurtenancy
requirement in riparian law to this desire to monitor for "overexploitation of the common pool."
Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 970 (1985); id. at 981
(suggesting that the ambivalence in riparianism toward the sale of water rights arises out of a
worry of introducing "a more intensive use, which [would] diminish the correlative rights of other
claimants to the common pool"); id. at 982 (characterizing the disfavor toward nonriparian uses as
the result of "the fear of surcharge against the common pool"); see also id. at 983 (discussing
Roman usufructuary rights, which also could not be sold to third parties, and which Epstein
attributes to a fear of"more intensive or destructive use[s] by the new party in possession").
75. ACHESON, supra note 56, at 74-76 (describing the "codified set of rules" that govern
"boundary defense" and that are a result of the "encapsulated political system" in which the
harbor gangs exist (internal quotation marks omitted)); OSTROM, supra note 41, at 73-74
(describing a traditional irrigation system in Valencia, in which users withdraw water from a ditch
in a specified sequence, and thus are able to monitor the withdrawals of those users before and
after them in line).
76. See ACHESON, supra note 56, at 51 (describing cooperation within cliques); ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 52-62 (1991)
(explaining the long-term accounting in which ranchers engage); Rose, supra note 57, at 65. See
generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (finding that repeat play
can produce cooperation even among self-interested individuals).
77. Berkes, supra note 66, at 87.
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Indians to engage in lavish potlatching practices, which D. Bruce Johnsen
sees as a way to ensure territorial exclusion.78
Finally, exclusivity allows community members to maintain a sense of
control and autonomy. As one commentator has pointed out, "[P]roducers
[in a common property situation] seem to oppose and flagrantly to violate
any outside restriction on their practices, even when they would almost
certainly regulate themselves if left in control., 79 Barton Thompson's study
of water institutions in the western United States illustrates the same point.
In these institutions, where outsiders are regarded somewhat suspiciously,80
local users have been able to implement customized rules to conserve
scarce water supplies much more successfully than has the state.8'
2. The Ownership Restriction in the Common Law
Common property regimes thus succeed in conserving resources in part
by excluding others. Exclusivity maintains user control, provides
opportunities for extensive monitoring, and facilitates the development of
restrictive use norms by those closest to the resource. As Anthony Scott and
Georgina Coustalin have noted, restrictions on transferability of riparian
water rights likewise seek to protect "the exclusivity of the right in the
stream-wide group of users. 82 I therefore turn to cases from the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, which-while perhaps not always strictly
adhering to the appurtenancy requirement--demonstrate its inherently
exclusionary tendencies.
For instance, in cases dealing with grants of water rights to
nonriparians, early courts held that such grantees were not entitled to full
riparian rights. In Gould v. Eaton, for example, the defendants, who were
nonriparians, had contracted for the right to place a tunnel on the grantor's
78. Johnsen, supra note 67, at 61-65. Although Johnsen refers to the property rights as
"exclusive," id. at 41, they were rights exclusive to a tribe, or numaym, id. at 61, and were thus
common within the tribe.
79. E.N. Anderson, Jr., A Malaysian Tragedy of the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE
COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES, supra note 66, at 327,
341.
80. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets,
81 CAL. L. REv. 671, 700, 724-39 (1993) (describing users' unresponsiveness to outside interests
and unwillingness to trade water with external users).
81. See id. at 698 (detailing a number of arrangements, including pro rata sharing, limits on
groundwater pumping, well-spacing rules, hydrologic barriers, taxes, and tiered pricing structures,
that users have developed for conservation purposes and that initially appear to have improved
efficiency). The importance of local control has elicited comment in other contexts. See OSTROM,
supra note 41, at 64 (noting that an important feature of communal-property management in
Torbel, Switzerland, is that appropriators themselves make decisions).
82. Anthony Scott & Georgina Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 821, 831 (1995). Riparian law's failure to achieve this objective is taken up in the
next Part.
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riparian land in order to divert water. 83 The California Supreme Court
affirmed an injunction prohibiting the diversion and explained the extent of
the defendants' entitlement under such a grant: "[It] gave [defendants] no
right in the land which is adjacent to the stream, and they took by the
contract no riparian rights in the waters of the stream .... ,,84 While the
defendants might have had a contractual right that was good as against the
grantor, they had no rights as against other riparian proprietors. They were,
in effect, excluded from the riparian community. Other courts have come to
the same conclusion.
In one such case, Roberts v. Martin, the plaintiff was a gristmill
operator, and the defendants owned nonriparian land near the plaintiffs
parcel.86 In addition, the defendants purchased from an upstream riparian
owner the rights to one of the springs on his land. The court held that their
diversion of water violated the plaintiffs riparian rights.87 The court noted
that the doctrine of reasonable use as between riparian proprietors did not
include "'the case of an interference by a stranger, who, by any means, or
for any cause, diminishes the flow of the water; for this also is wholly
wrongful, and no question of the reasonableness of his action in causing the
diminution can possibly arise.,,' 88 The court in essence announced a per se
rule against water use by nonriparians, or "strangers," under which no such
use could ever be found reasonable.
Perhaps more ambiguously, in Williams v. Wadsworth the Connecticut
Supreme Court recognized the rights of a nonriparian owner based on his
longstanding usage and acceptance within the riparian community.89 The
plaintiff, a nonriparian, had purchased in 1851 from a riparian landowner
"the right to build and maintain upon the land a dam," from which he
diverted water via a pipe to his house. 90 He used the water for domestic
purposes, and also sold some of it to other town residents. 91 The defendant,
who owned a one-acre upstream parcel, began in 1881-thirty years after
83. 49 P. 577, 577-78 (Cal. 1897).
84. Id. at 578.
85. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 110 P. 927, 932 (Cal. 1910)
(Shaw, J., concurring) ("The water cannot be severed from the land and transferred to a third
person so as to give him the title and right to remove it, as against other riparian owners. The
grantor alone will be estopped by such a conveyance."); Hendrix v. Roberts Marble Co., 165 S.E.
223 (Ga. 1932); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' Sch., 103 N.E. 87, 89 (Mass. 1913); see also Scott
& Coustalin, supra note 82, at 883-84 (concluding that while nonriparians were allowed by some
courts to contract for use rights, they could only sue their grantor, because courts would not
recognize nonriparian claims against other riparians).
86. 77 S.E. 535 (W. Va. 1913).
87. Id. at 536.
88. Id. at 537 (quoting Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 422 (1874)) (emphasis added).
89. 51 Conn. 277 (1883).
90. Id. at 277.
91. Id. The sale of water to town residents may also have suggested to the court that the
plaintiff was somewhat akin to a municipal water company, an entity usually excepted from the
appurtenant ownership requirement. See infra note 138.
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plaintiff had begun his usage-to divert water via "an acqueduct of his
own.., to his residence and premises," no part of which was riparian. 92
The plaintiffs brief noted that after considerable expense, the defendant
succeeded in supplying himself with water, which he used
for domestic and culinary purposes, for watering his horses and
cattle, for supplying a fountain or fountains, and for sprinkling his
lawn and the street in front of his dwelling-house. A considerable
quantity of the water thus diverted has run to waste, and none of it
has been restored to the stream.93
The court upheld the claim of the nonriparian plaintiff as against the
riparian defendant, finding that he had acquired a prescriptive right through
adverse use for the required statutory period.94 Given the uncertainties that
often surround prescriptive rights in riparian law and the narrow scope
courts generally give to such rights,95 it seems likely that the court
considered other factors in finding the right. Indeed, the court took special
notice of the fact that the plaintiff had secured from "all lower proprietors"
a release by deed from any claims for his diversion.96 Moreover, at the time
that the dispute arose, the plaintiff had been -using the water for
approximately thirty years, while the defendant had been diverting for less
than three years. The court thus seemed to find that the nonriparian
plaintiffs usage-because longstanding and because explicitly accepted by
the other riparian proprietors-was riparian, while the riparian defendant's
diversion was not. Although the case might be read as an equitable
exception to the ownership requirement, it can also be interpreted as
confirming the community principle behind the appurtenancy requirement.
The release from liability that the plaintiff had sought and received from the
other riparian proprietors, and his long-accepted diversion of the water,
demonstrated that his usage had survived the community's scrutiny. In
other words, his nonriparian status was outweighed by his proven entry into
the web of interrelationships and monitoring that characterizes a common
property regime.
Finally, in a number of cases, courts granted plaintiffs injunctions
against nonriparian diversions in part out of a concern that such nonriparian
usage might ripen into a prescriptive right. The Roberts court, for example,
92. Williams, 51 Conn. at 282.
93. Id. at 285.
94. Id. at 306.
95. See Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 308 (describing the "uncertainties in the
reasonable use theory of prescriptive rights," the difficulty with determining when the prescriptive
period begins, and the tendency of courts to limit title acquired by prescription to "the least
adverse use actually made by the claimant").
96. Williams, 51 Conn. at 301-02.
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noted that "[t]he unlawful act of defendants will, in time, ripen into an
adverse right if permitted to continue. Equity affords complete and speedy
redress in the premises. 97 Such cases may have reflected the fear that a
nonriparian user might forcibly gain access to the resource without properly
entering the riparian community, again confirming the exclusivity principle
behind appurtenancy.
The ownership component of the appurtenancy doctrine thus arguably
gestures toward a key feature of common property management-limiting
access to a group of users defined by their proximity to the resource at
stake. A wide range of scholarship illuminates the ways in which such a
restriction can assist in the conservation of a common-pool resource,98 and
early case law reveals such dynamics guiding courts in their decisions.
While exclusivity in itself is not necessarily admirable, other ideas central
to appurtenancy-the ability of those close to the resource to develop
sustainable practices and to monitor each other's usage, and the importance
of user control over resource management--deserve attention in the
establishment of any regime governing a scarce resource.
B. The Use Restriction
The other component of the appurtenancy doctrine is its use restriction,
under which water may only be used upon riparian land.99 In this Section, I
argue that appurtenancy and its sister doctrines operated more or less as a
97. Roberts v. Martin, 77 S.E. 535, 538 (W. Va. 1913); see also Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co.,
29 F. Cas. 506, 509 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,322) ("If, then, the diversion of water complained
of in the present case is a violation of the right of the plaintiffs, and may permanently injure that
right, and become, by lapse of time, the foundation of an adverse right in the defendant, I know of
no more fit case for the interposition of a court of equity, by way of injunction, to restrain the
defendants from such an injurious act."); Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 88 P. 978, 981
(Cal. 1907) ("'Nor is the [riparian] owner... required to show in order to procure an injunction,
any actual present damage. The diversion, by lapse of time, may grow into a right. To prevent
such result, an injunction will be awarded."' (quoting Stanford v. Felt, 16 P. 900, 900-01 (Cal.
1886) (citations omitted))); Gould v. Eaton, 49 P. 577, 578 (Cal. 1897) ("[T]he claim of the
defendants that they have a right to divert ... authorizes [plaintiff] to invoke the aid of equity in
order that this claim may not ripen into a right."); Clinton v. Myers, 46 N.Y. 511, 520-21 (1871)
(enforcing the riparian defendant's right to the natural flow of water, even if it was asserted
through a "bad motive," because the plaintiff, whose business would be destroyed were the
defendant allowed to assert his rights, had acquired no prescriptive right in the water).
98. A recent scholar reviewing and synthesizing scholarship on common-pool resources
confirms that small group size, shared norms, and interdependence among group members,
supplemented by cheap exclusion technologies, are increasingly recognized as key facilitating
conditions for common property regimes. See Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and
Institutional Sustainability, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 36, at 41, 62-63.
99. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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cap on total usage. I examine a number of cases demonstrating courts'
sense that riparian land within the same watershed served as a rough proxy
for the amount that could safely be withdrawn from the stream. I then
consider usage restrictions in a range of common property settings to
emphasize the importance of setting limits on withdrawal, as well as the
competence of those most familiar with a resource in determining the
appropriate level of withdrawal.
1. The Use Restriction in the Common Law
The case of Williams v. Wadsworth illustrates the limitation principle at
work. 100 As described above, the plaintiff in Williams, though a nonriparian,
had been diverting water, with the permission of all lower riparians, for
approximately thirty years.1°1 When the defendant, a riparian, began
diverting water to a nonriparian parcel, the plaintiff sued and was granted
an injunction. The court's discussion of the extent of the defendant's
riparian rights is telling:
Being a riparian owner the defendant has the right to consume
water upon riparian premises .... But this use is to be confined to
riparian land. This limitation.., stands upon the necessity for a
restraining rule in order to secure something for all, and upon the
presumption that the brook will supply the absolute needs of as
large an area as is usually held in riparian ownership.
102
The court then warned that "[i]f land not riparian may draw to itself,
equally with land riparian... then land not riparian may take precedence of
land riparian and deprive it of water for either man or beast." °10 3 In short, the
court's decision seems to rely on a rough estimate that the amount of water
needed to supply riparian parcels generally approximates the amount of
water that may safely be withdrawn without depleting the stream.
0 4
Some readers will likely question how effective the appurtenancy
requirement could be at confining total usage, given that a riparian
landowner could in theory purchase larger and larger parcels of land and,
100. 51 Conn. 277.
101. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
102. Williams, 51 Conn. at 304 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. See also Butler, supra note 2, at 108 (describing physical constraints on water use as
aimed at providing "reasonabl[e] assur[ance] that sufficient water would exist in the future");
Lauer, supra note 40, at 5 & n. 13 (describing the appurtenancy requirement as arising out of "a
fear that riparian owners would suffer a shortage of water if nonriparians were admitted to its
use").
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under the unity-of-title rule that applies in most riparian states, 10 5 could
thereby exercise her riparian rights on an increasing area of land. In
response, I would emphasize that the court's opinion in Williams is offered
not to prove the conceptual limits of the use restriction, but rather to
illustrate the underlying principles at work in the case law--conserving
against scarcity and relying on the judgment of user-owners as to parcel
size. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the appurtenancy doctrine
did not function alone, but rather operated in conjunction with other
limitations on the total area of land that could benefit from riparian water
rights.
First, many courts applied a "watershed limitation" in addition to the
appurtenancy requirement; the conjunction of the two rules reflects a desire
to limit withdrawal from the stream. 10 6 In Anaheim Union Water Co. v.
Fuller, the court held that "[l]and which is not within the watershed of the
river is not riparian thereto, and is not entitled... to the use or benefit of
the water from the river, although it may be part of an entire tract which
does extend to the river." 0 7 Although a parcel might be contiguous to a
river, only that portion of the parcel within the river's watershed was
considered riparian. The court went on to explain the logic behind this
doctrine:
The principal reasons for the rule ... are that, where the water is
used on such land, it will ... return to the stream, so far as it is not
consumed, and that, as the rainfall on such land feeds the stream,
the land is ... entitled, so to speak, to the use of its waters.' °8
Or as Richard Ausness explains, "The watershed limitation is based on the
assumption that land beyond the watershed is outside the boundaries
105. This rule, in contrast to the source-of-title rule, see infra note 106, "treats all lands in a
contiguous tract under a single ownership ... as riparian so long as any part of the tract touches
the waterbody-regardless of the history of prior ownership," Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra
note 1, at 223. For a definition of the source-of-title and unity-of-title rules, see Donald R. Levi &
Kenneth C. Schneeberger, The Chain and Unity of Title Theories for Delineating Riparian Land:
Economic Analysis as an Alternative to Case Precedent, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 439, 440 (1972). For
evidence that the unity-of-title rule results in forty percent more riparian land than the source-of-
title rule, see Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 223 n. 104.
106. See Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 226-27. Another restriction that has been
applied to riparian rights in some states is the source-of-title, or chain-of-title, rule. Under that
test, only land that has been riparian at all times retains the riparian rights; thus, when a riparian
tract is subdivided, those parcels no longer contiguous to the watercourse lose their riparian status,
"even if [later] reunited with riparian land under a single ownership." Id. at 223. Under the source-
of-title rule, riparian land can only diminish. The rule has mainly been applied in western states.
See Levi & Schneeberger, supra note 105, at 440 (noting that the source-of-title rule applies only
in certain western states, and thus questioning whether it "will be a part of the riparian doctrine of
any eastern state").
107. 88 P. 978, 980 (Cal. 1907).
108. Id.
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established by nature for riparian ownership .. . ."109 In other words, the
watershed requirement aimed to preserve the body of water in the stream by
allowing it to be used only upon land that naturally returned such water to
the stream. 110 In this way, the appurtenancy and watershed rules worked
together to reduce the effects of withdrawals.
Some courts imposed even further limitations. For instance, the court in
Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn limited riparian usage not only to land within
the same watershed but also to land acquired in a single transaction."' The
plaintiff town owned a reservoir that supplied its residents with water. The
defendant owned a very small parcel of riparian land-a twenty-five-foot
strip-upstream from the reservoir, as well as a parcel downstream, upon
which her house was located. Although the downstream parcel was also
riparian, it had been acquired separately from the upstream parcel. 12 The
town sued the defendant when she began diverting water from her upstream
strip to her downstream parcel, since water thus diverted bypassed the
reservoir altogether." 13 The court ultimately held for the plaintiff, enjoining
the defendant from further diversion.114
Putting aside for the moment the plaintiffs distribution of the water to
nonriparian town residents,1 15 the court's opinion reveals a sense, similar to
that displayed in the Williams opinion, that the size of riparian parcels will
generally protect against depletion of the water source. Although the
holding ultimately relied on the fact that the downstream receiving parcel
was in a separate watershed from the upstream diverting parcel, and thus
was nonriparian with respect to that diversion,' 16 the court nevertheless
made sure to expound upon the single-ownership rule. Quoting from
Farnham's treatise on water rights, the court took note of
"the rule that all land must be regarded as riparian which is within
the natural watershed of the stream, the title to which is in one
owner and the boundaries of which have been established in
accordance with the requirements of the conditions which will best
109. Ausness, supra note 2, at 203-04; see also Butler, supra note 2, at 111-12 (highlighting
that the watershed rule "appears to take into account the hydrologic cycle" and conforms to the
scientific view of the watershed as an ecosystem).
110. Dan Tarlock has called for greater attention to watersheds in the definition of property
rights from an ecological, hydrologic perspective. See A. Dan Tarlock, Reconnecting Property
Rights to Watersheds, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 69, 81 (2000) (characterizing
the use restriction as "reinforc[ing] watershed protection"). Interestingly, Tarlock sees reasonable
use doctrine as part of the watershed protection element inherent in common law riparianism. Id.
This account conflicts with my own. See infra Part III.
111. 106 S.E. 508 (Va. 1921).
112. Id. at 511.
113. Id. at 513.
114. Id. at 516.
115. Supplying town residents with water from the reservoir was, of course, technically a
nonriparian use. But see infra note 138 and accompanying text.
116. Zinn, 106 S.E. at 513.
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serve the interests of individual landowners.... The watershed
should certainly form a limit beyond which the riparian rights
cannot be claimed; but there is a question whether or not that limit
is not too wide .... Under this rule the boundary of riparian land is
restricted to land . acquired by one transaction.'
17
Guarding against the possibility that land within a watershed, or separate
riparian parcels held by a single owner, might "'recognize such a vast
extent of territory as riparian land [so as to be] destructive,' ' ' .8 the court
thus seemed to rely on the judgment of individual purchasers by using
parcel size as a rough proxy for the area that could profitably be supplied by
the stream in question.
2. Capping Mechanisms in Common Property Regimes
Taken together, these cases suggest that the appurtenancy requirement
and related doctrines functioned as a rough cap on withdrawal, by relying
both on naturally arising drainage patterns and the judgment of riparian
owners. The appurtenancy and single-transaction requirements in particular
exhibited the law's faith that riparian proprietors would purchase parcels of
sustainable size. I conclude this Section by examining a number of
analogous property regimes in which usage rules function as capping
mechanisms, restricting the amount that may be withdrawn from a
common-pool resource. This comparison places appurtenancy's reliance on
riparian owners within the context of a range of mechanisms adopted by
appropriators to voluntarily restrict their own resource usage.
Multiple scholars have identified voluntary limits on total usage as a
key factor in the sustainability of common property regimes. In describing
the common grazing areas under the English open field system, for
example, Smith notes that not only was access to common grazing areas
restricted "to a small closed class of appropriators," but further restrictions
on usage also applied.1 9 In particular, "stints," or limits on the number of
animals that could graze on the commons, essentially functioned as a
capping mechanism, since "one sheep cannot eat much more even if it is
allowed to graze longer."12 Stints, like the appurtenancy requirement and
its sister doctrines, served as "proxies for harmful activities"; 121 the eating
capacity of sheep, like the size of riparian parcels, inherently limited total
usage. The success of the open field system, both in increasing productivity
117. Id. at 512 (quoting 2 HENRY PHILIP FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 463a, at 1571-72 (1904)).
118. Id. (quoting 2 FARNHAM, supra note 117, § 463a, at 1571).
119. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 54, at 460.
120. Id. at 471.
121. Id.
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and in overcoming the potential tragedy of the commons posed by
communal grazing areas, has been well-documented. 22 Stints, which
proved extremely "effective and widespread"1 23 in preventing overuse, were
a central component of this success.
Other examples of voluntary restrictions on usage abound. Acheson
credits lobster gangs' self-imposed reductions in fishing efforts-in
particular, voluntary limits on the number of traps, which necessarily
limited total catch' 24 -for "both economic and biological benefits,"
including greater lobster density and higher lobstermen profits. 2 5 Swiss
villages have sustained a communal alpine economy since the thirteenth
century by requiring that officials first "mark[] the trees ready to be
harvested," which allows for "a careful assessment of the condition of the
forest."12 6 In the extensive common lands regulated by Japanese villages for
centuries, "detailed authority rules speciflied] in various ways how much of
each valued product a household could harvest from the commons and
under what conditions."'' 27 And, perhaps most pertinent to the appurtenancy
context, more than one huerta irrigation system has limited water rights to
certain areas of land; designations of some parcels as irrigated and some as
dry have lasted for centuries. 1
28
Examining the use restriction of appurtenancy doctrine in light of the
practices of common property regimes allows us to make two observations.
First, from a resource standpoint, the restriction, while no doubt often
inefficient and inequitable in confining water usage to adjacent land,1 29 may
nevertheless have stemmed from a quite rational desire to limit withdrawal
by users of a scarce resource. Appurtenancy and its sister doctrines may
have tried to cap usage by drawing on the proxies of adjacency, watershed
boundaries, and parcel size, just as medieval peasants relied on sheeps'
digestive systems, and Maine lobstermen relied on the size of standard
fishing traps. Second, as a structural matter, both appurtenancy and
successful common property regimes seem to have relied on the intimate
knowledge of proximate user-owners in determining the appropriate level
122. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000); id. at 134-36 (collecting sources).
123. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 54, at 471.
124. Traps, like sheeps' stomachs, are finite in capacity.
125. ACHESON, supra note 56, at 154-56.
126. OSTROM, supra note 41, at 65.
127. Id. at 67.
128. Id. at 71 (highlighting such a practice in Valencia and observing that "the right to water
inheres in the land itself'); id. at 76 (discussing the same for Murcia and Orihuela).
129. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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of withdrawal. 3 ° For common-pool resource management, both insights-
about the need to cap withdrawal and the expertise of those closest to (and
thus most familiar with) a resource in setting such caps-are essential.
III. REASONABLE USE AND THE DECLINE OF
THE APPURTENANCY REQUIREMENT
This Note began with the premise that, in light of continuing water
shortages, eastern states need to reassess current water regulation and
develop more sustainable resource-management practices. Resisting the
preference exhibited by most commentators for comprehensive and
centralized regulation, I instead turned to an unlikely place-the
appurtenancy doctrine-and suggested that appurtenancy contained certain
structural features that have proved successful in governing and conserving
scarce resources in a variety of common property contexts. A complete
account, however, must recognize that the success of riparianism in
restricting access and usage has been, at best, quite limited.
Though modern treatises still define riparian rights as those
"concerning the relation of the owner of the bank of a stream to various
features of the stream,"1 31 most commentators recognize that the
appurtenancy doctrine-the feature that gives riparianism its very
name13 -is today subject to numerous exceptions. "[E]very state," notes
James Christman, "allows some means of transferring riparian rights apart
from the land." 133 Granted, the law regarding these transfers varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and remains far from clear: 134 Some states
recognize conveyances, though whether such conveyances are valid only
against the grantor, or against all other riparians, is a matter of some
dispute; 135 a number of states recognize the right to lease riparian water
rights; 136 and a fraction of all states recognize prescriptive nonriparian
130. The Swiss villagers discussed above, for example, assessed forest conditions and then
determined harvest levels. See supra text accompanying note 126. Fikret Berkes similarly notes
that the sustainability of Cree fishing practices in part arose from their dependence upon fish: "[A]
subsistence fishery has a built-in self-limiting principle." Berkes, supra note 66, at 85; see also
Agrawal, supra note 98, at 62-63 (identifying as key conditions of successful common property
regimes that (1) group members are highly dependent on the common-pool resource and (2)
restrictions on harvest correspond to the rate of regeneration of the resource). In this respect, the
idea that reliance on a resource produces an awareness of the need to limit withdrawal is not
unrelated to my claim that familiarity with a resource allows users to more accurately set
sustainable withdrawal levels.
131. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 87.
132. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
133. Christman, supra note 2, at 28.
134. Dellapenna, supra note 19, at 39.
135. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 291-92.
136. See, e.g., Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 172 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1946).
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rights. 137 Nevertheless, the general trend has been away from appurtenancy
and toward increasing nonriparian use.138 Recent reformulations of the law
likewise recognize the need for nonriparian rights. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts does not consider "classification of [a use of water] as
riparian or nonriparian" to be controlling, 139 and the influence of this view
is seen in court decisions-most notably Pyle v. Gilbertl40-that recognize
nonriparian rights. And finally, the permitting systems and regulated
riparian regimes that increasingly govern surface water in eastern states also
recognize nonriparian rights as permissible. 1
41
Why did the appurtenancy doctrine never really take hold, and what
relevance does this have for modem resource management? In this Part, I
offer two accounts. In Section A, I examine cases in which courts made
exceptions to the appurtenancy requirement; this doctrinal analysis leads
me to conclude that the reasonable use doctrine that increasingly governed
riparian water law during the nineteenth century inherently allowed for
expansion of the riparian community and the acceptable set of riparian uses.
Section B offers some broader historical reasons for the failure of the
appurtenancy doctrine, emphasizing the cavalier approach to natural
resources that characterized the United States during the era of
industrialization. In the next Part, I draw on these conclusions and suggest
that the tolerance for increased usage inherent in the reasonable use
doctrine continues to have significance today.
A. Reasonable Use as Doctrine
Under the reasonable use doctrine, "each owner of riparian land is
permitted to use the water in a waterbody, regardless of the effect the use
has on the natural flow, so long as each user does not transgress the equal
137. See Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 304-12 (discussing prescriptive rights and
citing cases).
138. All states, even those that deny that water can be conveyed for use on nonriparian land,
recognize the right of municipal water suppliers to condemn water for public water supply
purposes. Id. at 299-304 (discussing condemnation of riparian rights and citing cases); see also
Christman, supra note 2, at 25-26, 28. I consider condemnation of riparian rights for municipal
water supply to be substantially different in character from conveyances of, or prescriptive claims
to, riparian rights by private parties. My discussion here is thus not meant to apply to such
exercises of eminent domain.
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 (1979); see also id. § 855 cmt. b (suggesting
that it "may be reasonable" to allow riparians to use water on nonriparian land, and finding a per
se rule against nonriparian uses to be "unreasonable").
140. 265 S.E.2d 584, 589 (Ga. 1980).
141. See Patricia K. Flood & Kenneth R. Wright, Summary of Water Rights Law in the 31
Eastern States, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 105 (listing
numerous states in which nonriparian use is allowed by permit); see also Dellapenna, supra note
19, at 42 (claiming that "often one of the princip[al] motives of the enactment of a regulated
riparian statute was to authorize the use of water on nonriparian land").
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right of other riparians to use the water."'' 42 The rise of reasonable use
doctrine during the nineteenth century, replacing the more stringent natural
flow theory of riparian rights, 143 has been the subject of considerable
scrutiny.144 The argument here is that reasonable use, at least as framed by
nineteenth-century courts, was a doctrine inherently tolerant of expanding
uses of water; as such, it operated in tension with the appurtenancy
doctrine, which I have characterized as inherently restrictive.
The classic statement of riparianism in American law is Justice Story's
opinion on circuit in Tyler v. Wilkinson. 145 In that case, the lower riparian
plaintiffs claimed that upstream proprietors were entitled only to water that
the plaintiffs did not need. The court, however, rejected this suggestion,
holding that "[t]here may be, and there must be allowed of that, which is
common to all, a reasonable use. 146 While the opinion seemed to hold fast
to natural flow theory in some respects,1 47 it also acknowledged what
Morton Horwitz has called "the utilitarian criterion of valuable use [as] the
ultimate source of legal rules."1 48 Specifically, Story rejected the idea that
riparianism would allow for "no diminution whatsoever.., for that would
be to deny any valuable use."' 149 The Tyler case, while still nominally
adhering to natural flow doctrine, thus opened the door to a balancing
approach to riparian rights that would take into account "valuable use."
Further elaboration of the reasonable use doctrine has only added to its
malleability. In the 1883 case of Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, for
example, the Minnesota Supreme Court offered this definition of the factors
to be taken into consideration in a reasonable use analysis:
In determining what is a reasonable use, regard must be had to
the subject-matter of the use; the occasion and manner of its
application; the object, extent, necessity, and duration of the use;
the nature and size of the stream; the kind of business to which it is
subservient; the importance and necessity of the use claimed by one
party, and the extent of the injury to the other party; the state of
142. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 241.
143. Under natural flow theory, also known as the English Rule, each riparian is entitled to
water flow in its "natural condition, without alteration by others of the rate of flow or the quantity
or quality of water." Id. at 233.
144. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 31-47 (1977); CAROL M. ROSE, Energy and Efficiency
in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 163 (1994) (reprinting Carol M. Rose,
Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261
(1990)).
145. 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit Justice).
146. Id. at 474.
147. See id. ("[Riparian proprietors have] a right to the use of the water flowing.., in its
natural current, without diminution or obstruction.").
148. HORWITZ, supra note 144, at 39.
149. Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474.
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improvement of the country in regard to mills and machinery, and
the use of water as a propelling power; the general and established
usages of the country in similar cases; and all the other and ever-
varying circumstances of each particular case bearing upon the
question of the fitness and propriety of the use of the water under
consideration. 150
The reasonable use analysis thus became open-ended and case-specific.
Such a utilitarian approach, concerned as it is with comparing social costs
and benefits, is inherently open to expansion; it allows-indeed, it
encourages-courts to take into account the economic value of the
infringing user's activity. As Smith notes, such tort-based rules do not
protect rights, but rather focus on "the efficient use of resources. Scarcity
over resources is reduced to bilateral conflicts over use." 151 The key
considerations are "maximiz[ing] value" and "optimal resource allocation,"
rather than protection against global scarcity.152 A reasonable use regime is
governed by considerations of "social values and needs" 153 and "general
rules of permissible and impermissible human conduct"; 154 as such, it is
inherently "fluid and socially responsive. ' 55
Finally, consider the focus on actual injury in the reasonable use
inquiry. As Justice Story put it in Tyler, "The true test of the principle and
extent of the use is, whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or
not."'156 Courts often cite the doctrines of de minimis non curat lex and
damnum absque injuria in rejecting plaintiffs' claims, finding damage
nonexistent, or simply too small to justify a remedy.' 57 This rule, too, fits
with an expansionist interpretation of reasonable use: Defendants will not
be enjoined, even if their activities violate established rules of riparian use,
unless plaintiffs can actually show injury.
Reasonable use's tolerance for expanded usage is perhaps most
apparent in those cases allowing exceptions to the appurtenancy
requirement. In these decisions, reasonable use essentially swallows up the
150. 15 N.W. 167, 169 (Minn. 1883). For a similarly open-ended list of factors for
determining reasonable use, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 139, § 850A.
151. Smith, The Law of Nuisance, supra note 54 (manuscript at 11).
152. Id. (manuscript at 3); see also Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at
13-14 (characterizing the reasonable use test as "a relational test, a weighing of the social value of
the two uses against each other to determine which use is more valuable to society").
153. Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 481, 502 (characterizing the
transition to reasonable use as a move from property-based water rights to tort-based water
wrongs).
154. Id. at 503.
155. Id. at 502; see also iid. at 500-01.
156. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312) (Story, Circuit
Justice).
157. See GOULD & GRANT, supra note 40, at 251 (discussing Gehlen v. Knorr, 70 N.W. 757
(Iowa 1897), in which the plaintiffs' mill was not materially affected and their claim was therefore
rejected).
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appurtenancy doctrine. In Elliot v. Fitchburg Railroad, for instance, the
defendants purchased a riparian parcel upstream from the plaintiffs land
and diverted water to their depot to furnish locomotive engines.158 Although
the diversion violated the appurtenancy rule, the court held the defendants
"not liable" because the plaintiff had not "suffered actual perceptible
damage."' 59 Reasonableness, it held, was "a question of degree," not the
absolute rule appurtenancy would impose.160
Similarly, in Jones v. Conn the court allowed the defendant to irrigate
nonriparian land and power a gristmill over the complaint of the plaintiffs,
who used the water to irrigate riparian parcels. 161 In opposition to the theory
of appurtenancy described above, the court noted that "whether a proposed
use is... reasonable, does not depend so much upon the area of the
land.., or the place of use, as upon the effect it has upon... the other
proprietors." 162 Here, the "amount of water taken... was not sufficient to
materially injure the plaintiffs," so the defendant could not be deemed a
,,wrongdoer."'163
Even more extreme is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's statement in
Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.164 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
Stanolind from obstructing water flow and taking the water for nonriparian
purposes. The court emphasized that nonriparian use "standing alone, [is]
no criterion of the reasonableness of the use .... [A] riparian owner has the
right to make any use of water.., possible, so long as he does not inflict
substantial or material injury [on other riparians].' 65
Doctrinally, one can therefore link the decline of the appurtenancy
doctrine-or perhaps more accurately, the refusal of courts to insist upon its
strict application-to the rise of reasonable use. The appurtenancy doctrine,
which we might characterize as a resource-focused limiting rule, conflicted
with the user-focused balancing rule of reasonable use. This account is thus
somewhat in tension with Rose's description of the reasonable use doctrine:
[R]iparian law in the nineteenth century effectively turned river-
bank landowners into participants in common property regimes for
particular rivers, from which outsiders were excluded (no interbasin
water transfers) and insiders were expected to use the common
158. 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191, 192 (1852).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 194.
161. 64 P. 855 (Or. 1901).
162. Id. at 860 (emphasis added).
163. Id.
164. 172 P.2d 1002 (Okla. 1946).
165. Id. at 1005.
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resource "reasonably"-in effect, in a way that was compatible
with equal correlative use by all the other riparian owners. 166
In other words, Rose suggests that both place-of-use restrictions and the
reasonable use doctrine were a part of the common property regime. The
view offered here, however, is that reasonable use actually worked in
opposition to and defeated the restrictive common property elements of
appurtenancy. While reasonable use initially may have governed a
community of insiders, the doctrine's tendencies to treat uses and users
"reasonably," to consider the social value of activities, and to decide in
favor of efficiency and productivity, would inevitably lead to expansions of
the community as well as the range of accepted uses. While the Tyler test of
injury initially looked only to the impact on, and competing claims of, other
riparian proprietors, 67 its principle of balancing and value maximization
would eventually require consideration of the interests of outsiders. In
short, reasonable use sooner or later tended to undermine appurtenancy.
This account of reasonable use versus appurtenancy allows us to draw a
conceptual distinction among different types of what Smith calls
governance rules-a distinction not fully apparent from Smith's analysis,
but important for resource-management purposes. Under Smith's
taxonomy, governance rules involve the "specification of proper activities"
for which a resource may be used. 168 Given this broad definition, both
appurtenancy's use restriction and the reasonable use doctrine would
qualify as governance rules, since both speak to appropriate usage:
Appurtenancy specifies the parcels of land on which water may be used,
while reasonable use (at least in theory) specifies the purposes for which it
may be used. Smith's focus is on the relative information costs of different
rules, and he thus differentiates between governance rules of greater and
lesser specification.1 69 He does not, however, distinguish between rules that
limit total usage and those that merely aim to balance conflicting users'
interests. He sees governance, like exclusion,1 70 as an "alternative method[]
of preventing dissipation,"1 71 without recognizing that certain governance
rules, such as the reasonable use doctrine, may actually facilitate increased
usage of a resource. Smith notes that common property regimes often
involve both exclusion rules and "rules of proper use among [group
members]," which may "promote conservation and sustainability of
166. Rose, supra note 37, at 179.
167. See supra text accompanying note 156.
168. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 54, at 455.
169. See id. at 468 (describing different levels of detail and cost associated with different
rules for a grazing commons).
170. Exclusion rules delegate decisionmaking about resource usage to the owner, by
restricting access to the resource.
171. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 54, at 474.
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common-pool resources."' 7 2 But he does not acknowledge that some
"proper use" rules emphasize limitation, while others may focus on value
maximization-a distinction that is at the heart of riparian law's shift from
appurtenancy to reasonable use. Smith does briefly address the transition
from natural flow theory to the reasonable use doctrine, but asserts only that
"exclusion tends to give way to governance as pressure on the resource has
increased,"1 73 without analyzing the implications of reasonable use for a
resource under pressure. His analysis thus misses the key difference among
governance rules that this Note has emphasized in the two riparian regimes.
Examining the limited success of the appurtenancy doctrine in relation
to the reasonable use doctrine, and analyzing the cases in which courts
allowed the former to give way to the latter, one can see an important
conceptual distinction-limiting versus balancing-among various regimes
aiming to conserve scarce resources.
B. Reasonable Use as Historical Development
The rise of reasonable use, however, is not an entirely satisfactory
explanation of why appurtenancy failed to take hold. Indeed, doctrinal
analysis simply begs the question: It explains what judges did, but not why
they did it. In this Section, I briefly offer some suggestions as to why judges
turned away from appurtenancy and constructed an ever-broadening notion
of reasonable use.
Morton Horwitz's legal realist account holds that the rise of reasonable
use and fall of natural flow was part of what he calls "the transformation in
the conception of property" that occurred during the nineteenth century.1
74
The reasonable use standard was "an open-ended formula through which
common law judges could implement their own conceptions of desirable
social policy.' ' 175 What I described above, somewhat agnostically, as the
value-maximizing tendency of reasonable use is viewed by Horwitz in more
political terms, as "central... to the needs of industrial development... in
the nineteenth century" and "essential to economic improvement." 176 Rose
summarizes Horwitz's explanation succinctly: "[L]egal developments [in
water law] gave a kind of common law subsidy to capitalist developers,
allowing them to inflict some injury upon weaker and less enterprising folk
without having to pay for the consequences."'' 77 Theodore Steinberg, an
environmental historian, agrees: "The drive to promote industrial growth
172. Smith, The Law of Nuisance, supra note 54 (manuscript at 21-22).
173. Id. (manuscript at 50 n.148).
174. HORWITZ, supra note 144, at 31.
175. Id. at 39.
176. Id. at 40.
177. ROSE, supra note 144, at 165.
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had, in the process, reduced water to an instrument in the service of
economic change. Water by the early years of the nineteenth century was
well on its way to becoming a simple utility, an abstraction employed to
suit economic ambitions.... a commodity.'
78
Other, less political explanations are available, and they complement
Horwitz's account. As riparianism moved beyond New England, into
southern and western parts of the country, it encountered regions where
water was used less for power-an instream use that would not have found
the appurtenancy doctrine unduly restrictive179-and more for consumptive
uses. such as irrigation and farming.'80 In these areas, a more tolerant
attitude toward withdrawals by nonriparian owners for use on nonriparian
land undoubtedly seemed more attractive. Moreover, once steam became a
major source of energy,18 ' and the mill economy of the Northeast declined,
"courts began to appreciate the fact that it would be efficient to increase the
consumption of many streams and they began to develop a law of
consumption through the reasonable use theory."' 8 2 In short, both economic
and geographic expansion of the nation likely gave impetus to doctrinal
change.
Finally, the need to expand the acceptable uses of water went
unchecked by any sense of scarcity. Quite simply, the humid eastern states
did not face the same shortages as western states. I8 3 Courts lacked a
pressing reason to adhere to the logic of conservation and restriction
embedded within the appurtenancy doctrine. With water plentiful and the
economy expanding, the dominant ethic of industrialization demanded the
178. THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE
WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND 49 (1991); see also id. at 21-49 (describing the rise of the New
England mill economy); id. at 88 (noting that "water [was defined] principally in terms of its
value for exchange and production"); id. at 147 (characterizing reasonable use doctrine as
"flexible" and framed in terms of the "best interests of 'communities,"' favoring "those who
demonstrated that their use of the water benefited everyone, whether it actually did or not").
179. ROSE, supra note 144, at 186 ("Eastern riparian rights grew up around the use of water
forpower-that is, instream power .... ).
180. Id. at 188 (noting that riparian owners in locations like Florida and Iowa tend to engage
in more "zero-sum" uses of water, such as irrigation, than riparian owners in New England);
see also Robert E. Beck, Waters, Water Rights, and This Treatise, in 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1, 30 (documenting the greater livestock and irrigation water use in
southern and midwestern regions of the country than in New England). Flatter terrain in the
Midwest was more conducive to fanning than the hillier land in the East, and thus a more
attractive candidate for irrigation. I thank Carol Rose for highlighting this point.
181. See STEINBERG, supra note 178, at 244-45 (describing the decline of the hydraulic mill
system and the rise of steam-powered textile factories in the Merrimack Valley over the course of
the nineteenth century).
182. Tarlock, supra note 1, at 251.
183. See Gould, supra note 1, at 8-9 (comparing water resources in the East and West, and
emphasizing that, "[i]n the East, water resources are relatively abundant [since the] climate is
humid, irrigation is not necessary for successful farming, and demand for water has historically
been low," whereas in the West, "water resources are scarce and highly variable"); David Haber,
Introductory Essay, in THE LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES, at
xxv, xxv (David Haber & Stephen W. Bergen eds., 1958).
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fullest use of natural resources.' 84 In such a climate, courts found little need
to insist on ownership or use restrictions, and plenty of reasons to tolerate
expanded access and withdrawal.
This Part has offered two explanations for the weakness of the
appurtenancy requirement in riparian law. As a doctrinal matter,
appurtenancy and its restrictive attitude conflicted with, and succumbed to,
the more tolerant balancing approach of reasonable use. As a historical
matter, appurtenancy's values of limitation and conservation did not fare
well under the pro-development, efficiency-maximizing policies of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, nor did they seem necessary in
light of the seeming abundance of water. This comparison of the reasonable
use and appurtenancy doctrines proves helpful as we return, in the next
Part, to regulated riparianism.
IV. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF APPURTENANCY'S PRINCIPLES
Having considered in some depth the two basic doctrines of
riparianism-appurtenancy and reasonable use-as well as the features of
common property regimes that have enabled users to sustain and conserve
scarce resources, we are now able to draw several conclusions to aid us in
our evaluation of regulated riparianism: First, restricting access to a
resource to its closest users can facilitate the development and enforcement
of conservation norms. Second, because users are generally resistant to
external oversight, placing management authority in their hands will often
increase the likelihood that they will adopt effective resource usage
practices. Third, because users will generally have greater familiarity with
the resource and its changing dynamics than government actors, they are
often better able to determine appropriate levels of usage and to limit their
withdrawals accordingly. Finally, regimes that rely on a value-maximizing,
balancing approach are less likely to protect scarce resources against
growing demand than regimes that take a more restrictive, limiting
approach. With these observations in mind, I offer a critique of current
water law regimes in Section A. While a full-scale policy proposal is
beyond the scope of this Note, I do suggest, in Section B, a number of ways
in which the lessons of appurtenancy and common property management
may be applied to water law today.
184. See STEINBERG, supra note 178, at 69-71.
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A. Reasonable Use Redux?
I begin by drawing attention to the survival of the reasonable use
doctrine under current regulatory schemes. Most statutes list a set of factors
for agencies to use in deciding whether or not to grant a permit; such lists
closely resemble the open-ended inquiries conducted under the reasonable
use doctrine in cases such as Red River Roller Mills.185 The Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code, for example, provides a list of nine factors to
be taken into account by the permitting agency, including "the economic
and social importance of the proposed water use and other existing or
planned water uses sharing the water source.0 86 Such lists "can only
reinforce the sense that the substantive basis for decision remains much the
same as in traditional common-law litigation under the reasonable use
theory of riparian rights."'' 87 While advocates of riparian statutes stress that
such decisions are made ex ante, rather than ex post, 88 I would question the
extent to which moving the reasonableness inquiry from an ex post judicial
decision to an ex ante administrative determination can counteract the
tendency of such balancing tests to permit increased usage, instead of
protecting scarce resources. As one scholar comments, "[I]n permit-based
jurisdictions, allocative standards make little effort to distance themselves
from their riparian ancestors."
' 189
Supporters of regulated riparianism may note that every permitting
statute requires the administering agency to develop long-term plans to
protect the source for future needs, 90 and that almost all permitting statutes
also "require the agency to define or protect minimum flows."' 9' But the
existence of such statutory mandates does not ensure protection of water
resources. Long-term plans, for instance, are often developed according to a
list that, again, echoes the reasonable use inquiry; 192 they are thus unlikely
to result in greater conservation. Furthermore, statutory mandates to protect
minimum flows have proved, in practice, difficult to administer, given
"traditional water management" values and the "considerable discretion"
185. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
186. THE REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE § 6R-3-02 (Am. Soc'y of Civil
Eng'rs 1997). For a summary of factors considered in other statutes, see Dellapenna, Riparianism,
supra note 1, at 495-96.
187. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 497.
188. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 34 ("The most important
difference [from the common law] is that an administering agency decides before a use begins
whether it is reasonable .. " (emphasis added)); Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 448
(calling the permit requirement "the most significant innovation under regulated riparianism").
189. Abrams, supra note 2, at 270.
190. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 522-23.
191. Id. at 529; see also Sherk, supra note 26, at 311-14 (describing minimum-flow
protections).
192. Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 524.
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granted administering agencies. 93 In Arkansas, for example, where a
regulated riparian statute provides for the protection of minimum stream
flows, "[t]he process of setting minimum flows has proven highly political,
[resulting in] considerable modification (and reduction) of the proposed
original levels of protection."' 94 A series of recent agency and court
decisions in Vermont has severely limited the ability of the state's
permitting agencies to use the public trust doctrine to protect minimum
stream flows. 195 Lack of strong enforcement of minimum-flow protections,
combined with the persistence of reasonable use inquiries in permitting
decisions and long-term planning, may thus indicate that regulated
riparianism will fare no better at conserving water supply than its common
law predecessor.
B. Local-Global Possibilities
Rather than press for greater centralization and control while adhering
to reasonable use inquiries and multifactor tests, regulators should take a
step back and consider potential alternatives to the comprehensive
management model. Indeed, common property scholars have extensively
documented the disastrous consequences-in both ecological and human
terms-that can result from wrongheaded state intervention.' 96 In light of
the analysis offered in this Note, I would urge serious consideration of
regulatory responses that attend to scarcity in a way that incorporates the
core principles of appurtenancy. In other words, while regulated riparianism
193. Id. at 533-35.
194. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra note 1, at 55-56.
195. In re Okemo Mountain, Inc., No. 2S0351-12A-EB (Vt. Environmental Board Sept. 18,
1990) (concluding that agencies do not have common law public trust duties, unless they are
expressly delegated by statute); see also In re Okemo Mountain, Inc., No. 2S0351-12A-EB
(Vt. Environmental Board Mar. 27, 1992) (allowing Okemo ski resort to increase its withdrawal
of water from the Black River-though not to the extent requested by Okemo--over the
objections of environmentalists, for the purpose of snowmaking); Fitzgerald, supra note 29
(describing this litigation).
Use of the public trust doctrine as a means of protecting environmental values has attracted
much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization
of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573 (1989);
James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970). It is, however,
beyond the scope of this Note.
196. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 41, at 143-81 (describing a series of centralized efforts to
reform resource management that have "destroy[ed] ... effective [common property] institutions
without necessarily developing effective alternatives"); Evelyn Pinkerton, Intercepting the State:
Dramatic Processes in the Assertion of Local Comanagement Rights, in THE QUESTION OF THE
COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES, supra note 66, at 344, 344
("Actions of the Canadian state, especially through [the Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans], have played a key role in the decline of the salmon fishery... by both inciting and
exacerbating problems that... are attributed solely to the common-property nature of the
resource.").
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has until now included primarily the reasonable use strand from common
law riparianism, I would instead emphasize the appurtenancy strand.
Some readers will no doubt question the feasibility of returning to the
strictures of the appurtenancy doctrine. Indeed, confining water usage to
adjacent bodies of land, for the benefit of the owners of those parcels,
seems neither a realistic nor a desirable goal for contemporary water
management. I would suggest, however, that appurtenancy need not be
conceived of solely as a physical restriction. Instead, I propose here an
understanding of appurtenancy as a structural, organizational concept for
resource management. It is this reconceptualized notion of appurtenancy
that may prove valuable for policymakers today.
1. Reconceptualizing Appurtenancy
The traditional understanding of appurtenancy focused on physical
proximity: Only owners whose property abutted the water had rights to it,
and only their adjacent land could benefit. But as the cases reveal, and as
comparisons to common property scholarship highlight, the doctrine was
not solely about physical proximity, but also contained certain structural
principles of resource management. Limiting riparian rights to adjacent
owners excluded "strangers" and thus defined a group of users who could
enforce conservationist norms of behavior. Restricting usage to appurtenant
parcels demonstrated a reliance on those most familiar with the resource to
determine appropriate levels of usage. In other words, appurtenancy
doctrine expressed a commitment to vesting resource management in those
closest to, and sharing an interest in, the waterbody. In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, this structural commitment coincided with physical
proximity; adjacency functioned as a proxy for defining the most
knowledgeable community of users. But in a twenty-first-century world in
which water consumption needs are vastly different, we should perhaps
de-emphasize the physical requirements associated with appurtenancy and
focus instead on its delegation of governance rights to those most intimate
with the resource, whether physically proximate or not.
Under this definition, appurtenant users would no longer necessarily be
those with property bordering a given resource, but would rather be defined
as those within a given region using a resource in a similar way.
Membership in a community of users would be conceived of not in terms of
adjacent land ownership, but rather in terms of the particular use-whether
irrigation, recreation, or municipal water supply. Appurtenancy, on this
understanding, would vest management authority not in those physically
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proximate, but in those functionally proximate-both to the resource and to
a like group of users.'
97
Putting appurtenancy to work in a contemporary water regime would
thus mean recognizing the competence of communities of users in
effectively governing scarce resources. At first glance, the workability of
such a governance scheme in the eastern water context might seem dubious.
After all, the examples of community management discussed above
generally involve close-knit groups that are able to exclude outsiders
because of their small size, and whose ability to conserve resources depend
largely on longstanding social ties.' 98 While such community-based regimes
might work in the context of small streams or rivers, they seem implausible
when it comes to larger watercourses that may span not only great
distances, but also multiple jurisdictions.1 99 Moreover, unlike the irrigators
in huerta communities or the farmers in medieval England, the
heterogeneity of water users in eastern states makes traditional collective
action seem unlikely to succeed. 200  And while common property
management has proved successful at addressing conservation concerns, its
exclusionary nature and resistance to outside interests might not sit well
with those worried about efficiency and equity.
In response to such concerns, I would first suggest that appurtenant
groups need not be limited to homogeneous communities of individual
users; users drawing on the same body of water for similar purposes could
be considered appurtenant, even if they were institutional entities. Second, I
would emphasize that small-scale community-based management and
197. Physical proximity will likely continue to be common among appurtenant users; those
most familiar with a resource are still often necessarily those located nearby, though perhaps not
owning directly adjacent land. The point is that physical adjacency need not be the defining
characteristic of appurtenancy.
198. Members of Maine's lobster gangs, for example, have "long-term, multistrand ties with
one another." ACHESON, supra note 56, at 49. The Cree Indian fisheries studied by Berkes
likewise relied on "social mechanisms" to enforce conservation norms. Berkes, supra note 66,
at 87.
199. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
200. Diverse interests are often involved in eastern water disputes, in both the North and the
South. See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 31, at 290-91 (describing the conflicting interests of
farmers, berry growers, ski area operators, salmon fishers, and environmental organizations in
Maine's water resources). Similarly, the fight among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over the
Chattahoochee River arises from the competing claims of various groups of users. In Alabama,
water is needed for drinking, industry, agriculture, and recreation; in Florida, for seafood
cultivation and wetlands salinity preservation; and in Georgia, for pulpwood forest irrigation, farm
irrigation, and a growing population. See Stephenson, supra note 9, at 85-86.
Some evidence suggests that heterogeneity among users impedes cooperation.
See Pranab Bardhan & Jeff Dayton-Johnson, Unequal Irrigators: Heterogeneity and Commons
Management in Large-Scale Multivariate Research, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra
note 36, at 87, 102 (concluding that "heterogeneity, however it might be measured, has a negative
impact on cooperation" in the irrigation cases studied, because it weakens the effectiveness of
social norms and sanctions). Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson do express some cautious optimism
about the effects of heterogeneity under certain conditions-for example, global-scale commons,
see id. at 106-but evidence of such positive effects is preliminary and tentative.
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comprehensive government regulation are not the only options. We may do
better if we avoid "the familiar trichotomy of private, communal, and state
ownership,"201 and instead pay more attention to the possibilities of local-
state co-management. °2 As Oran Young suggests, rather than "focus[ing]
exclusively on finding the right level or scale at which to address specific
problems .... the key to success [may instead lie] in allocating specific
tasks to the appropriate level of social organization and then taking steps to
ensure that cross-scale interactions produce complementary rather than
conflicting actions. 20 3 Indeed, much recent work in common property
scholarship and institutional economics more broadly has been directed
toward the possibilities of local-state co-management. Thus, just as the
Note drew on the first wave of common property scholarship to illuminate
our understanding of the appurtenancy requirement, I now turn to more
recent work in the area to inform our regulatory policies going forward.
Specifically, I consider what Elinor Ostrom has called "nested enterprises,"
in which "[a]ppropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict
resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers. 20 4
Under such a model, respect for appurtenant communities could be
embedded within a larger-scale government system.
While nested enterprises may sound intriguing in theory, readers may
wonder whether such efforts work in practice, and how they would work in
the context of eastern water law. In the remainder of this Note, I thererefore
describe successful examples of cross-scale management. I also suggest
reasons to believe that such regimes may provide the advantages of both the
commons and the state, while mitigating, rather than exacerbating, their
respective weaknesses. I conclude by arguing that multilevel governance
may be particularly well-suited to the dilemmas facing eastern water
regulators. In particular, nested regimes that embed appurtenant groups
within an administrative scheme may more effectively address the three
major concerns--conservation, efficiency, and equity-that surround
allocation of our water supply.
20 5
201. Agrawal, supra note 98, at 44.
202. Id. at 58 (arguing that "the nature of local-state relations requires more careful
exploration").
203. Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of Cross-
Scale Interactions, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 36, at 263, 266; see also Carol
M. Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing
Community-Based Management to Tradable Environmental Allowances, in THE DRAMA OF THE
COMMONS, supra note 36, at 233, 239 (recognizing the possibility of "larger governmental
institutions... interven[ing] to organize 'nested' [common property regimes]").
204. OSTROM, supra note 41, at 101.
205. Pollution has been and remains a major problem for eastern waters. See, e.g.,
STEINBERG, supra note 178, at 191 (stating that industrial waste was a significant source of
pollution in the Merrimack River by the 1860s); id. at 205-06 (describing the rapid decline of New
England's water quality over the nineteenth century); Tarlock, supra note 1, at 250 (arguing that
protection of instream uses, rather than protection against scarcity, is the major concern for
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2. Nested Enterprises: Some Models
Numerous instances of successful nested enterprises exist. This
Subsection explores four models and considers in each instance how norms
of usage and conservation developed by appurtenant groups can be
effectuated within a larger government system. These examples highlight
the ways in which nested enterprises may yield the advantages of both the
commons and the state, while mitigating the weaknesses of each.
One nested enterprise model, which we might call the reverse
command-and-control model, utilizes state authority, expertise, and
administrative resources to enforce usage rules developed by appurtenant
groups to protect against scarcity. For example, the Maine lobster gangs
have, in recent years, formed links with state government, which in turn
aids them in the enforcement of their voluntary restrictions on fishing.
Acheson notes that the inhabitants of Monhegan Island have "persuaded the
legislature to pass a law forbidding fishing in Monhegan waters from June
25 to January 1," thereby making official a customary closed season that
the islanders have observed since the early 1900s. 20 6 Fishers from Swan
Island likewise convinced Maine's commissioner of marine resources to
enforce a self-imposed limit on the number of traps surrounding the
island.207 A similar example comes from the Aleut community in Alaska,
where the community controls access to the territories, and thus can control
the level of fishing, but has also "made the state limit fishing effort in
adjacent territories where the local stocks might be intercepted by
outsiders.
20 8
Yet another example can be found overseas, in the state of Kumaon in
India, where centralized rules create "a framework for the management of
forests rather than a defining straitjacket," and at the same time establish "a
domain of relatively autonomous action and rule making in which local
residents and their representatives can operate.', 20 9 Specifically, local
authorities "make rules and enforce them," "facilitate some kinds of
actions .. and restrict others," meet frequently to modify rules, and "create
monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. 210  The state government
supplements these efforts by supervising recordkeeping, coordinating
harvesting, providing technical assistance, and aiding in rule
eastern water). While the nested governance model could certainly prove applicable to pollution
problems, the focus here is on extractive uses. A complete analysis of state and federal pollution
regulation of surface water in the East is beyond the scope of this Note.
206. ACHESON, supra note 56, at 158.
207. Id. at 159.
208. Pinkerton, supra note 196, at 345, 368.
•209. Arun Agrawal & Jesse Ribot, Accountability in Decentralization: A Framework with
South Asian and West African Cases, 33 J. DEVELOPING AREAS 473, 482 (1999).
210. Id.
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enforcement.21' As these examples demonstrate, reverse command and
control takes advantage of the greater skill of local users in developing rules
of conservation, and places those rules under the enforcement authority of
government.21 2
Another nested governance model that has gained attention recently
combines market-based tradable allowances with community management.
Under tradable allowance schemes,
governmental regulators in effect place an upper limit or cap on the
total quantity of a given resource that is to be available for use....
The regulators then divide the capped total into individual
allowances. Henceforth they require all resource users to purchase
or trade for whatever allowances they use.21 3
In a nested enterprise model, quotas are allocated to appurtenant
communities, rather than individuals or individual entities. In Alaska, for
example, some of the walleye pollock quota was allocated to native
communities; similarly, New Zealand transferred forty percent of its fishery
quota to the Maori.214 Such schemes incorporate groups of users-
proximate both to each other and to the resource-into a larger regulatory
market, thereby protecting community interests215 while maintaining the
advantages of a centralized decisionmaker for setting and managing overall
goals.
216
In these regimes, as compared to the reverse command-and-control
model discussed above, the state does not undertake enforcement of
specific usage restrictions developed by the user community. Instead, it
grants an appurtenant group of users a block of rights that is presumably
large enough to allow the group to maintain a sustainable level of
withdrawal, leaving the group to implement and enforce its own
conservation norms. At the same time, the tradable allowance scheme
permits user groups to operate within a broader market of uses and users.
The existence of a wider market in standardized rights can facilitate
transfers from lower- to higher-value uses, thereby increasing the efficiency
211. Id.
212. Indeed, we might be more comfortable with placing enforcement authority with the
state, as some of the enforcement techniques employed by Maine fishermen involved misogyny
and violence. See Rose, supra note 203, at 252; Rose, supra note 57, at 66-67 (stating that the
traditional enforcement mechanism of common property regimes is self-help).
213. Rose, supra note 203, at 235. Market solutions to regulatory problems are still
controversial. See infra note 254. The point here is that they provide a model combining broader
governmental oversight and appurtenant user management.
214. Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits Approach to Protecting the Commons: What
Have We Learned?, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 36, at 197, 210.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 222. Tietenberg does note that some co-management tradable permit systems give
more control to users, and some less. Id.
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of resource usage.217 The creation of standardized rights can also facilitate
coordination across different appurtenant groups-functioning as a kind of
common language and in some instances leading to larger-scale
conservation efforts.218
A third model-what we might call the horizontal governance model-
comes from voluntary associations of groundwater users in Southern
California. These nested enterprises should be particularly persuasive not
only because they involve water as opposed to fisheries or forest
management, but also because they demonstrate the viability of such a
model among institutional, as opposed to individual, users. The parties
involved here are not members of an Indian village, or an Aleut fishing
community, but include municipalities, utility companies, and private
mutual corporations.
Elinor Ostrom documents the rise of "a set of institutions [established
by water producers] to manage a series of groundwater basins located
beneath the Los Angeles metropolitan area., 219 Faced with the prospect of
saltwater incursions, dropping aquifers, and uncertain rights, appropriators
began to engage in a "pumping race," a classic example of a tragedy of the
commons. 22 During the 1940s and 1950s, many believed that the race
would result in the destruction of the basins, with dire consequences for the
water supply in southern California.221 But instead of succumbing to the
tragedy, water producers entered into a series of negotiations, through
which they were able to form institutional structures that combined public
and private governance, 222 to set restrictions on withdrawals, and to institute
conservation measures. Nested within the public arena, private actors were
able "to impose constraints on themselves."
223
A few features of these settlements are particularly noteworthy. First,
the disputes arose among functionally appurtenant users-claimants with
shared interests in the same body of water. Second, in coming up with a
217. See Rose, supra note 57, at 59.
218. See id. at 70-71 (noting that individual rights-holders of fishing quota systems have
essentially formed new common property regimes, and that communities that have been given a
stake in wildlife preservation have developed new norms of conservation "among themselves and
among other communities").
219. OSTROM, supra note 41, at 104.
220. Id. at 109.
221. Id. at 110.
222. Ostrom discusses a few different institutional arrangements that developed. The
Raymond Groundwater Basin negotiations led to an out-of-court settlement enforced in part by
the state. Id. at 113-14. The Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District, an entity with
public powers to tax, sue, and provide public goods, id. at 133, was created by water producers
after a private association-intended to provide a forum for water producers and agencies, id. at
115-failed to garner complete cooperation, id. at 128. Importantly, private water associations,
which we might term appurtenant groups, continue to actively participate in the district's
decisionmaking, as do a number of public agencies, thus allowing Ostrom to characterize the
entity's structure as "polycentric." Id. at 113.
223. Id. at 110.
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solution, it was important to the users that they maintain some measure of
management authority; they did not want to turn decisions over to large-
scale agencies, "for fear that they would lose control of the decisions being
made and might end up worse off. '224 In short, they exhibited the same
desire for autonomy and self-governance as members of the common
property regimes discussed above. 225 Third, while users maintained
decisionmaking control, they did so within a larger governmental regime;
the institutional solution was neither deregulation nor centralization, but
rather "polycentric" systems226 of shared private-public governance. While
the first two models of nested governance are largely vertical and thus
somewhat hierarchical, with the state at the top and user groups at the
bottom, this model vests management authority in a more horizontal, or
multipronged, manner. Fourth, the costs of monitoring and enforcement
were shared by the users (two-thirds) and the state (one-third).227 And
finally, the negotiations among parties led to a better clarification of rights,
which in turn allowed a market to develop, leading to a transfer of rights to
those using them at "a higher value.,
228
The Ostrom study allows us to draw two important conclusions. First,
appurtenant groups can be defined to include institutional users-here, the
appurtenant groups were voluntary associations made up of both individual
and institutional user-appropriators-who may prove just as capable of
developing and enforcing conservation norms as individuals within a small
community. Specifically, institutional appropriators restricted their water
usage and monitored each other's withdrawals, just as farmers in huerta
villages restricted water usage to certain parcels of land and kept an eye on
their neighbors' withdrawals. Second, a nested enterprise model in which
management is "polycentric" rather than centralized, and in which
229appurtenant groups of organized users actively participate, can produce
an allocation of tradable rights that is efficient and stable, as well as
conducive to conservation. As clarification of rights has proved difficult
under regulated riparianism, and a market in permits has failed to
materialize, the achievements of the entities Ostrom describes are
particularly noteworthy. In short, the horizontal governance model seems to
have had more success in resolving efficiency and conservation problems
than have eastern regulatory systems.
224. Id. at 128.
225. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
226. OSTROM, supra note 41, at 113.
227. Id. at 135.
228. Id. at 114.
229. Id. at 133.
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A fourth model-what we might call the umbrella model-is illustrated
by local water institutions in the western United States.23° Mutuals and
water districts are the retail distributors of most domestic water and much
agricultural water in western states. 231 Mutuals are private nonprofit
corporations whose customers are also shareholders; water districts, on the
other hand, are governed by elected boards, like other local government
units. "Both types of institutions engage in a broad set of activities,
including obtaining and storing necessary water supplies, transporting the
water to their service areas, and distributing it to their members. 232 For our
purposes, mutuals and districts may be analogized to appurtenant groups
(though the water they consume may come from a distant reservoir or dam),
as they allow groups of local users to access water jointly, thereby taking
advantage of economies of scale, and to maintain control over allocation
233within the group.
These institutions have developed into multilayered regimes, thus
exemplifying a more complex, cross-scale kind of nested enterprise than the
models already discussed. Mutuals and water districts may obtain their
water from a larger umbrella agency acting as a wholesaler,234 or they may
sit within larger umbrella institutions themselves.235 All of these institutions
ultimately sit under the general authority of the legislature.
Several features of these institutions are familiar. For instance, whereas
users have generally been resistant to state proposals for conservation, they
have been receptive to conservation programs implemented by local
institutions. These programs have been able to reconfigure groundwater
rights; impose well-spacing rules; institute pump taxes and import projects
to optimize use of ground and surface water; and establish loan programs,
conservation rebates, and, in some cases, tiered pricing structures.236 In
short, appurtenant groups of users have, here as elsewhere, voluntarily
recognized the need to conserve, and they have advanced creative methods
to meet that need, but in a way that emphasizes local control.
230. While the West is governed by a different legal regime, namely appropriation, for
determining water rights, the difference is unimportant in this context, where our focus is on the
nonlegal, institutional, and organizational dynamics at work, rather than on the allocation of water
under formal legal rights.
231. Thompson, supra note 80, at 687.
232. Id. at 688; see also id. at 687-89 (describing mutuals and water districts).
233. See id. at 689.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 718. Tom Tietenberg describes how water user associations in Chile perform "a
considerable role in allocating water resources .... Although the [central agency] has broad
authority in water resource management, much of the actual control over river flows is exercised
by the Juntas de vigilancia, associations made up of all users and user associations on a common
section of a river." Tietenberg, supra note 214, at 203 (citation omitted).
236. Thompson, supra note 80, at 697.
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Thompson also describes at length the failure of state governments to
facilitate voluntary transfers: "Legal restrictions on formal water transfers
pose insurmountable transaction costs for many small water users .... , 237
In response, users "have employed local institutions to obtain or exchange
water." 238 Institutions provide members with "largely interchangeable water
entitlements," allowing the development of standardized markets; members
of institutions are also likely to be familiar with each other's needs; and
many institutions have constructed extensive physical infrastructure that
facilitates the transfer of water from one user to another.2 39 Finally,
institutions have proved adept at allocating water during times of scarcity:
They can "balance their service areas, water supplies, and storage
capabilities .... [They] can also more readily calculate and enforce pro rata
allocations. 240 In the language of appurtenancy, physical, social, and
functional proximity among users facilitates efficient trade and reallocation
within the group.
Of course, mutuals and, to an even greater extent, districts can exhibit
some of the less savory features of appurtenant communities as well. While
they vary in size, and while some encompass a large geographic area and a
range of users, their success seems due in part to the homogeneous-and
sometimes insular-interests of their membership. Many mutuals are
"enlivened with a dollop of community spirit."24' While such community
spirit may make informal transfers between members less cumbersome than
statutory transfers 242 and encourage the adoption of stronger conservation
measures than those imposed by the state,243 internal community norms also
reflect the exclusionary tendencies and insider-outsider mentality that an
appurtenant group of users can exhibit. In particular, Thompson notes the
resistance of some local institutions to interjurisdictional transfers, such as
"ag-urban" trades. 244 Such resistance can often be the result of "parochical
self-interest that is inconsistent with broader societal good.
2 45
Importantly, however, Thompson does not advocate complete
centralization of control as the solution to this problem, and he is wary of
237. Id. at 676.
238. Id. at 677.
239. Id. at 710.
240. Id. at 696.
241. Id. at 699.
242. See id. at 721 (arguing that community norms against profit-making result in transfers
that are "quite informal," and that parties use "social balance accounts" to keep track of trades).
243. See id. at 698 (observing that institutions have "supplement[ed] the weak conservation
measures of state law," and that greater receptivity to such measures derives in part from the
insular nature of such arrangements, which do not include "outsiders").
244. Id. at 723-34.
245. Id. at 731; see also id. at 733 (noting that "[w]orries about community impacts also
motivate institutional opposition to external transfers").
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stripping too much authority from local institutions and losing the benefits
of appurtenancy described above:
Despite the potential advantages of creating larger water
institutions... attempts to enlarge or consolidate current
institutions will inevitably encounter numerous problems and
limitations....
... Legislatures therefore may do best by merely encouraging
institutions to examine the advantages of forming larger units, and
then making it as easy as possible for them to do so.
24
This approach might best be described as more nesting-increased usage of
intermediate, umbrella institutions that can facilitate interregional trades
among various sets of appurtenant groups, 247 and increased legislative
support for such institutions. While Thompson recognizes that more heavy-
handed state oversight may in some instances be necessary,248 his preferred
solution is neither purely regulatory nor purely market-based, but is rather
institutional. In the multilayered regime he proposes, larger associations can
overcome obstacles to market trade that currently exist by producing
internal economies of scale and internalizing the costs imposed by one
group on others.
3. Some Policy Suggestions
Having reconceptualized appurtenancy as a principle of functional
rather than physical proximity, and having determined that appurtenancy
can function within a larger-scale nested regime, we can now begin to ask
how such a regime might work in practice in the context of eastern water.
The four models outlined above-reverse command-and-control, market-
based tradable allowances allocated to communities, horizontal governance,
and increased nesting through umbrella organizations-may provide
246. Id. at 754 (footnote omitted).
247. See id. at 718-19 (describing the transfers between institutions that occur when those
institutions are both members of a larger, umbrella wholesaling institution, and pointing out that
"umbrella institutions typically aid transfers by creating standardized (and thus easily marketed)
rights and by providing necessary transportation facilities"); id. at 722-23 (describing the
formation of new umbrella institutions among water districts in California and Washington to
"ease the process of transferring water rights among themselves").
248. See id. at 723-24, 729 (explaining that districts have been resistant to external transfers,
especially where such transfers would require conservation or lead to a long-term loss for the
district); id. at 735 (suggesting that state and regional governments are better suited to answering
the social policy questions surrounding intergroup transfers); id. at 740, 746 (arguing that
incentives and structural reform may not be enough to encourage external transfers and suggesting
that in some cases, legislative overrides of institutional constraints on external transfers may be in
order).
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policymakers with a starting point. Berkes, using different terminology,
similarly suggests a range of ways in which states can facilitate cross-scale
management, including "legitimization of local institutions," enabling
legislation that gives authority to "locally devised rules," capacity building
"at all levels," and "institution building. 249 What "legitimization" or
"institution building" will mean in practice will depend on the particular
institutional structure in place in each jurisdiction, and the types of user
associations that exist. or that might be formed.25 ° While a comprehensive
policy proposal is beyond the scope of this Note, I would like to offer a few
preliminary thoughts as to how policymakers might incorporate
appurtenancy into eastern water management.
Given the efficiency and equity concerns posed by purely local
organizations, state regulatory agencies should retain ultimate authority
over the allocation of water rights. The question, then, is how states might
recognize appurtenant groups and include them-formally or informally-
in water management decisions. Perhaps the simplest option would be to
encourage the development of voluntary user associations, without
providing such groups any formal legal recognition. Such an arrangement
would allow appurtenant groups to form through self-identification, perhaps
utilizing industry or interest groups already in existence.25' States could
offer encouragement in several ways. As Ostrom's study of groundwater
basins in southern California demonstrates, provision of a public forum for
users can facilitate negotiation, information-sharing, clarification of rights,
and adoption of voluntary constraints by users.252 The state might further
support voluntary user action by offering assistance with information-
gathering (recall the recordkeeping function provided by the state of
Kumaon to local authorities) and the enforcement of any voluntary
agreements among users (for example, enforcement of trap limits in Maine
249. Fikret Berkes, Cross-Scale Institutional Linkages: Perspectives from the Bottom Up, in
THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 36, at 293, 299 tbl.9-2.
250. Florida, for example, is unique in institutional structure; it has divided responsibility for
water management among five regional districts, which correspond "to the diverse matches across
the state between need and availability of water." Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation, supra
note 1, at 60. The districts make permitting decisions, but remain under the supervision of the
state environmental protection agency. Flood & Wright, supra note 141, at 119.
251. For example, ski resorts in Maine and Vermont that divert water from rivers in order to
make snow for the slopes, see Bowman, supra note 31, at 292, may already be members of hotel
industry associations. In Massachusetts, citizen organizations have formed an umbrella network,
called the Massachusetts Water Watch Partnership, that provides training and technical assistance
to members to conduct water quality monitoring. See Mass. Water Watch P'ship, at
http://www.umass.edu/tei/mwwp/index.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). A similar organization
has mobilized around the Mystic River watershed. See Mystic River Watershed Ass'n, at
http://www.tufts.edu/mystic/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2004). An additional benefit of the
reconceptualized notion of appurtenancy-which emphasizes functional proximity to the resource
and shared interests with other users-is that it allows for the inclusion of environmental groups
within the range of appurtenant groups.
252. See supra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.
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lobstering waters, and the provision of one-third of the costs of a monitor
for groundwater basin withdrawals in southern California). This approach
could be characterized as capacity-building or institution-building, within
Berkes's taxonomy, and would in some respects parallel the reverse
command-and-control model delineated above. The primary objective
would be to aid in the development and enforcement of conservation norms
developed voluntarily by those most familiar with the resource.
Beyond such informal facilitation, state regulators could explore a
variety of ways to offer appurtenant groups more formal legal recognition.
One possibility that could work within a modified version of existing
permitting systems would be to issue blocks of permits to groups of users
rather than to individuals, along the lines of the market-based tradable
allowances model discussed earlier. Appurtenant groups might be defined
according to categories of uses (for example, farming, residential water
supply, commercial development, recreation). Such an arrangement would
afford appurtenant groups a measure of management authority regarding
their own usage.253 Freedom to trade and reallocate rights within groups
could assist in the development of conservation measures and efficiency
improvements. Appurtenant groups might also prove more effective at
distributing water among members during times of scarcity and responding
to fluctuations in user need and resource availability. The existence of a
larger market of permits might also facilitate intergroup coordination. At
the same time, a centrally administered permitting scheme would preserve
the ability of state administrators to set certain policy goals (such as
equitable distribution), to monitor overall usage, and to ensure coordination
of different user groups.
My hope is that the examples of nested regimes and suggestions for
eastern water offered in this Section will provide a starting point for the
reassessment of regulated riparianism. Regulators should resist the
tendency to call for greater centralization and regulatory control, and should
question the assumption that ex ante decisions made by an administrative
agency can alone solve the problems of scarcity and allocation that trouble
253. A change of this sort-which would shift permits, or some form of legal interest, into
the hands of groups and away from individual users or entities-might raise constitutional
questions. Given that the transition from common law riparian rights to permitting systems has
generally survived Takings Clause challenges, however, I think it likely that a group-based
permitting system, if constructed appropriately, would also survive such challenges. See
Dellapenna, Riparianism, supra note 1, at 512-21 (describing the few and generally unsuccessful
challenges to the adoption of permitting systems); see also GOULD & GRANT, supra note 40, at
318-19 (observing that few commentators seem troubled as to the constitutional validity of
permitting statutes).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
195120041
The Yale Law Journal
eastern water today. The institutional insights gleaned from appurtenancy
doctrine should inform the shape of water management institutions going
forward.
I have presented a few possible options for reincorporating
appurtenancy into water management, without urging any particular
approach. To a large extent, this Note remains agnostic as to the appropriate
degree of state oversight, noting only that administrators should be attentive
to the institutional model adopted, as certain regulatory forms may
themselves produce inefficiencies. Specifically, regulators might find that
cross-group coordination would best be achieved not via more assertive
forms of regulation, which have proved disastrous in numerous arenas, but
rather by market incentives2 54 or the formation of larger umbrella
institutions encompassing multiple smaller user groups. On the other hand,
a more aggressive regulatory approach may be necessary where parochial
community interests produce cross-group inefficiencies or inequities that
the market alone cannot resolve. Precisely what balance should be struck
between appurtenant groups and state oversight in the management of
eastern water is a question the Note does not seek to answer, and one whose
answer will very likely be contextual. Having argued for multilevel
governance and having sketched a few possibilities, this Note recognizes
that the remaining challenge is to understand exactly what institutional
design-what allocation of decisionmaking, monitoring, and enforcement
functions-will best achieve the goals of efficiency, equity, and
conservation in water usage and distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
At a time when eastern states face continuing water shortages, and
regulated riparian statutes are in need of reassessment, this Note offers new
254. A thorough exploration of the continuing debate over command-and-control versus
market-based regulatory policies is beyond the scope of this Note. A vast literature on this topic
exists. Compare Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment: Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-51 (1985) (arguing against command-and-control regulation
and for market-based regulation), and Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based
Environmental Policies, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY 105, 105 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C.
Esty eds., 1997) (arguing that the use of economic incentives in environmental regulation, while
not a panacea, has "worked exceptionally well in a number of areas"), with Howard Latin, Ideal
Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation and "'Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reform,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-73 (1985) (advocating uniform command-and-control regulation).
Here I would simply emphasize that certain elements of market- or incentive-based regulation
seem broadly consistent with the principle of user management I have identified in appurtenancy
doctrine. Market mechanisms-like the appurtenancy principle-are premised on user control and
the efficiency of user-developed techniques and practices. See Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining
Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 276 (summarizing the argument for market-based
mechanisms as being based on the "flexibility" and choice that such regulatory schemes give to
users).
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ideas about water management by turning to two different sources of
inspiration: the common law and the growing body of literature on common
property regimes. Despite the criticism it has garnered, the appurtenancy
requirement exhibits certain durable principles for conserving scarce
resources that this Note seeks to highlight. Moreover, in comparing
appurtenancy to reasonable use, this Note provides a new theoretical
perspective-contrasting limiting and balancing rules-with which to
assess resource management systems and the rules they impose. The Note
puts these conclusions to work in its analysis of regulated riparianism,
concluding that the retention of a reasonableness inquiry may undermine
efforts to conserve scarce water supplies. Rejecting the efficacy of such
open-ended balancing tests, the Note instead urges consideration of a new
institutional model-the nested enterprise model-as a way to manage
scarce resources. In the context of eastern water, the nested enterprise
model may offer policymakers a way to incorporate a reconceptualized
principle of appurtenancy-a principle that attends to scarcity and respects
the expertise of users in conserving common resources-into the broader
oversight and authority of the state. While the doctrinal rule may have
faded, the core concepts of appurtenancy can thus have continuing
relevance. Embedding those concepts in our water law and policy will
better allow us to conserve and manage our water supply.
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